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Article 
The Myth of Self-Regulation 
Fred C. Zacharias† 
Law in the United States is a heavily regulated industry.1 
Lawyers are licensed in each state.2 They are governed by pro-
fessional rules, usually adopted and enforced by state supreme 
courts.3 The courts regulate lawyers separately as well, 
 
†  Herzog Research Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. 
The author thanks Professor Steven D. Smith for his helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this article. Copyright © 2009 by Fred C. Zacharias. 
 1. James M. Fischer, External Control over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 59, 60 (2006) (“Today, law is a highly regulated industry . . . .”); 
Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior: The Sources and Uses of Proto-
cols in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 874 (2002) (“[S]elf-
regulation [of lawyers] is becoming a smaller part of the regulatory mix.”); 
John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTG-
ERS L. REV. 101, 102 (1995) (“Increasingly, professional ideals have been 
turned into enforceable law, and self-regulation by the organized bar has be-
come regulation by courts and legislatures.”); Russell G. Pearce, The Profes-
sionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve 
the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1275 (1995) 
(noting that the existence of disciplinary regulation and substantial regulatory 
law, including “tort law, criminal law, agency law, and securities law” belies 
the notion that lawyers are self-regulating); Symposium, Twenty Years of Le-
gal Ethics: Past, Present, and Future, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 321, 329 
(2007) (reporting comments of Professor Stephen Gillers: “We are seeing more 
of the rules governing lawyers coming out of the substantive law, in malprac-
tice cases, interpretations of fiduciary duty, through agency law, and construc-
tion of the attorney-client privilege.”). 
 2. See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR ASS’N 
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 
TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2007, at 3−5 (2007), available at 
http://www.ncbex.org/fileadmin/mediafiles/downloads/Comp_Guide/2007Comp
Guide.pdf (cataloguing state licensing requirements); Larry E. Ribstein, Law-
yers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 301 
(2004) (presenting a “new rationale for state licensing of lawyers”); Randall T. 
Shephard, On Licensing Lawyers: Why Uniformity is Good and Nationaliza-
tion is Bad, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 453, 460−61 (2004) (arguing in favor 
of maintaining state-by-state licensing of lawyers).  
 3. See American Bar Association, Center for Prof ’l Responsibility, Links 
to Other Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Pages, http://www 
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through supervisory decisions in the course of litigation and by 
implementing common law civil liability rules that govern legal 
practice.4 These include malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, 
and other causes of action.5 Administrative agencies—
particularly federal agencies—also establish and implement 
rules governing lawyers who practice before them.6 Federal and 
state legislatures play a further role in regulating the bar, pro-
viding statutory regulations7 and criminal penalties that apply 
to lawyers.8 
Nevertheless, courts,9 commentators,10 and legal ethics 
regulators11 continue to conceptualize law as a “self-regulated 
 
.abanet.org/cpr/links.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (providing state-by-state 
links to the governing legal ethics codes). 
 4. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regu-
lation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (discussing the rela-
tionship between the various forms of judicial regulation). 
 5. Id. (manuscript at 8, on file with author). 
 6. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends in Fed-
eral Regulation of Lawyers, PROF. LAW., 2003 Symposium Issue, at 16−22 (de-
scribing a range of administrative regulations of lawyers). 
 7. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (autho-
rizing the SEC to promulgate standards of conduct for securities lawyers); 
Heslin v. Conn. Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 461 A.2d 938, 941 (Conn. 
1983) (applying a consumer protection statute to a lawyer’s misleading adver-
tising); Fischer, supra note 1, at 97−108 (discussing a variety of legislative 
regulations of lawyer conduct); Shelley D. Gatlin, Note, Attorney Liability Un-
der Deceptive Trade Practices Acts, 15 REV. LITIG. 397, 400 n.9 (1996) (catalo-
guing state consumer protection statutes applicable to lawyers). Arguably, in-
surers serve as regulators as well, but their requirements typically do not 
have the force of law we normally attribute to “regulation.” See generally 
Fischer, supra note 1, at 63−95 (illustrating the ways private insurers influ-
ence lawyer conduct). 
 8. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 327, 330−52 (1998) (discussing the role of criminal law in regulat-
ing lawyers).  
 9. See, e.g., Guillen v. City of Chi., 956 F. Supp. 1416, 1424 (N.D. Ill. 
1997) (discussing “the bar’s capacity for self-regulation”); McConchie v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 273, 278 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (relying on Wieder v. 
Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992), for the proposition that the legal profession 
is unique in its self-regulatory nature); Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Sci-
vantage, 525 F. Supp. 2d 448, 449 (S.D.N.Y 2007) (“While frequently under 
fire, attorney behavior remains largely self-regulating.”); Averill v. Cox, 761 
A.2d 1083, 1089 (N.H. 2000) (“We are aware that consumers in the legal mar-
ketplace may feel especially vulnerable to attorney misconduct because the 
legal profession is self-regulated.”); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Giger, 37 
P.3d 856, 864 (Okla. 2001) (“The public must have confidence that the legal 
profession, which is self-regulated, will not look the other way when its mem-
bers break the law.”).  
 10. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-
Regulation, and the Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079, 1081 
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profession.” A Westlaw search reveals more than five hundred 
law review articles that refer to the concept in the last ten 
years alone.12 The preamble to the recently revised ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct maintains an emphasis on the 
importance of self-regulation,13 presenting the Model Rules 
themselves as a form of self-regulation despite the fact that the 
Rules are intended to be adopted as enforceable law by state 
supreme courts.14 The Preamble states: 
  The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other pro-
fessions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal 
profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship 
between the profession and the processes of government and law en-
forcement. . . . 
  To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their profes-
sional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. 
Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession’s indepen-
dence from government domination. . . . 
  The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special re-
sponsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility 
to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and 
not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. 
Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Profession-
al Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by 
other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the inde-
pendence of the profession . . . .15 
 
(2005) (arguing “against self-regulation of the legal profession”); Laurie A. Mo-
rin, Broken Trust and Divided Loyalties: The Paradox of Confidentiality in 
Corporate Representation, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 233, 233 n.1 (2004) (“Unlike 
most professions, the legal profession in the United States is largely ‘self-
regulating.’”); John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of Lawyer Self-Regulation: 
Learning from Ohio’s Struggle to Reform Its Disciplinary System, 68 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 65, 72−73, 111 (1999) (discussing the “self-regulation” of judges and law-
yers in the Ohio disciplinary process); Sandra Caron George, Comment, Prose-
cutorial Discretion: What’s Politics Got to Do with It?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ICS 739, 745 (2005) (“The legal profession is by and large self-regulated.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 795 So. 
2d 1, 35 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam) (comment to proposed rule 4−8.3, stating: 
“Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession 
initiate disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct”); In re Application of Okla. Bar Ass’n to Amend Okla. 
Rules of Prof ’l Conduct, 171 P.3d 780, 781 (Okla. 2007) (preamble to rules re-
vision stating: “Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's inde-
pendence from government domination”). 
 12. A search for DATE(AFTER 1998) & ((lawyers “legal profession” bar) 
/5 self-regulat!) in the Journals and Law Reviews database on March 11, 
2009, yielded 542 documents. 
 13. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 10 (2008). 
 14. Id. scope ¶ 19 (“Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition 
imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process.”). 
 15. Id. pmbl. ¶¶ 10−12. 
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The observation that many forms of law constrain the con-
duct of lawyers is nothing new, and no one would seriously 
question it.16 It is equally clear that, because lawyers partici-
pate heavily in producing the governing professional rules and 
the broader external law that affects the bar, lawyers in some 
respects are distinct among regulated professionals.17 Yet to 
judge by the continuing references to lawyer self-regulation in 
the commentary, many observers—among them the Model Rule 
drafters—hearken nostalgically back to a notion that lawyers 
are governed primarily through peer pressure, peer standards, 
and peer discipline that elevate the bar and limit the need for 
external regulation.18 Alternatively, the observers assume that 
 
 16. See Lawrence J. Fox, Dan’s World: A Free Enterprise Dream; An Eth-
ics Nightmare, 55 BUS. LAW. 1533, 1549 (2000) (“[T]hat mantra of self-
regulation recites what is largely a myth.”); Linda Fitts Mischler, Personal 
Morals Masquerading as Professional Ethics: Regulations Banning Sex Be-
tween Domestic Relations Attorneys and Their Clients, 23 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 
1, 93 (2000) (“Although the legal profession is often called a ‘self-regulating’ 
profession, this is a misnomer.”). 
For a realistic assessment of the interrelationship between lawyer self-
regulation (including professional discipline) and external constraints see Ted 
Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis 
Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639 (1994). Professor 
Schneyer evaluates the practical explanations for why external regulation, in-
cluding administrative regulation and civil lawsuits, targeted lawyers compli-
cit in the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s while disciplinary regulation was 
absent. Id. at 640−66. Schneyer then suggests that, in light of the practical 
realities of regulation and banking practice, future professional regulation 
needs to provide more detailed prophylactic protocols for the conduct of bank-
ing lawyers. Id. at 667. Such protocols would not, according to Schneyer, re-
flect “a major loss of influence for the profession,” but rather would illustrate 
that bar organizations should operate “in tandem,” or as co-regulators, with 
external overseers of lawyer conduct. Id. at 643. 
 17. Randy Lee, for example, emphasizes that, because judges are lawyers, 
“judicial regulation of lawyers remains lawyers regulating lawyers.” Randy 
Lee, The State of Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession: Have We Locked the 
Fox in the Chicken Coop?, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 69, 73 (2002). Benjamin Bar-
ton argues that, in promulgating professional codes, state supreme courts of-
ten are influenced—perhaps too heavily—by the proposals of the bar. Benja-
min H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should 
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. 
REV. 1167, 1186−88 (2003); see also Developments in the Law—Corporations & 
Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2237 (2004) (“The legal profession has histor-
ically conceived of itself as independent and self-regulating, and local bar as-
sociations continue to influence the ethics rules that state courts of last resort 
promulgate.”(footnote omitted)). 
 18. See, e.g., Kevin Hopkins, The Politics of Misconduct: Rethinking How 
We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 839, 865−66 (2005) (“The 
organized bar has contended that public confidence in lawyers is critical for 
the proper functioning of the legal profession, and therefore, effective self-
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because the profession is self-regulated, the resulting behavior-
al norms and implementation of discipline are self-serving.19 
 
regulation is necessary to preserve public faith in the integrity of the adminis-
tration of justice and to maintain the profession’s reputation for trustworthi-
ness.”); Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving 
Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 255 (2001) 
(“[L]awyers have the power of self-regulation. In comparison to all other pro-
fessions, the legal profession is the most free of external governmental con-
trol.”); Karel Ourednik IV, Multidisciplinary Practice and Professional Re-
sponsibility After Enron, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 167, 193 (2003) (“As a group that 
self-regulates, lawyers must address [the post-Enron] issues, formulate policy, 
and draft rules and regulations with effective enforcement.”); Kathleen M. Sul-
livan, The Good That Lawyers Do, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 7, 21 (2000) (“Law-
yers are self-regulated. . . . The price of professional autonomy and self-
regulation is some duty of service.”); Christopher M. Von Maack, Civility in the 
Practice of Law: A Young Lawyer’s Perspective, UTAH B.J., Nov./Dec. 2006, at 
22 (“As a self-regulated profession . . . lawyers have an individual and collec-
tive role to play in maintaining civility in the practice of law.”); cf. Keith R. 
Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 1017, 1025 (2004) (“The question is thus starkly posed: whether 
the legal profession remains completely capable of self-regulation, of providing 
legal services with honesty, integrity, and decorum, and of accepting fiduciary 
responsibilities not merely to clients but to a broader definition of interests a 
‘learned profession’ should serve.”); Deborah L. Rhode, Teaching Legal Ethics, 
51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1043, 1056 (2007) (suggesting that legal ethics courses 
should “remind future practitioners of the opportunities and obligations that 
come with membership in a largely self-regulating profession”). 
 19. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 142 (1989) (“The content of 
the ethical code and the nature of its enforcement both reflected jockeying 
among lawyers for competitive advantage.”); David Barnhizer, Profession De-
leted: Using Market and Liability Forces to Regulate the Very Ordinary Busi-
ness of Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 225 (2004) 
(“There is a universal law that tells us no one is capable of fairly judging 
themselves.”); Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: 
The Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, 
and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 419 (2005) 
(“[B]ecause the legal profession is basically self-regulating, most regulations 
governing lawyers are self-serving and aimed at increasing lawyer profits and 
protecting the monopolistic nature of the legal profession.”); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1293, 1316 (2003) (“[P]rivate self-regulation of attorneys through bar associa-
tions means the continued government of the guild, by the guild, and for the 
guild.”); Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of 
Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 231 (1996) (“[T]he bar has proved it-
self to be supremely self-serving in regulating itself . . . .”); Brian Finkelstein, 
Should Permanent Disbarment Be Permanent?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 587, 
594−95 (2007) (“The public perception that lawyers, members of a self-
regulated profession, are merely ‘protecting themselves’ by not utilizing per-
manent disbarment, is a real threat to the reputation of all lawyers.”); Kay A. 
Ostberg, The Conflict of Interest in Lawyer Self-Regulation, PROF. LAW., 
Summer 1989, at 6, 7 (characterizing the ABA and state bar associations as 
“trade organizations charged with advancing the interests of lawyers” and 
concluding that “[b]ecause trade associations do not represent the public, they 
 1152 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1147 
 
The debates concerning proposed amendments to the profes-
sional rules routinely include statements that if lawyers do not 
regulate themselves, external regulators will fill the vacuum.20 
The debates also tend toward the position that foreclosing ex-
ternal regulation would be a good thing.21 
 
should have . . . no role in deciding who enters the profession or in deciding 
conflicts between its own members and the public”); cf. Debra Lyn Bassett, 
Redefining the “Public” Profession, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 721, 724 (2005) (“With 
scandals come calls for additional rules and regulations, typically accompanied 
by criticism of the self-regulating nature of the legal profession as protection-
ism.”); Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regula-
tion, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977, 993 (2003) (arguing that the bar’s professional 
norms, in significant measure, have as their objective “the protection of the 
bar’s economic well-being”).  
 20. See W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American 
Lawyers: Perception, Reality, and the Professional Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. 
REV. 527, 537 (2002) (“Unless the organized bar cleans its own house, sooner or 
later government agencies will remove the unique measure of self-regulation 
granted to the legal profession . . . .”); Abraham C. Reich & Michelle T. Wirt-
ner, What Do You Do When Confronted with Client Fraud?, BUS. L. TODAY, 
Sept./Oct. 2002, at 39, 43 (“[L]awyers opposed to self-regulation beware: If the 
profession fails to adequately police itself, our government will enact legisla-
tion that not only polices lawyers, but extends liability for corporate gover-
nance fiascos.”); Kenneth M. Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Pro-
fessional Responsibility, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 167 (2006) (“Yet if 
lawyers are unwilling to recommit themselves to the regulation of their pro-
fession and their responsibilities to society, one might expect additional [ex-
ternal] regulations . . . .”); cf. Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Con-
tingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 653, 699 (2003) (“The self-regulatory regime that the bar maintains 
serves mostly to fend off other regulatory regimes.”); Morin, supra note 10, at 
234 n.4 (“The legal profession has jealously guarded its self-regulatory status, 
and I believe that the House of Delegates’ reversal of its long-standing position 
in August 2003 was based as much on its fear of state regulation as on any 
principled change of heart regarding client confidentiality.”); Ted Schneyer, An 
Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of Law Practice, 30 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559, 569 (2005) (noting that “state supreme courts and 
general-purpose bar associations do not consider ‘self-regulation’ moribund” 
and citing instances in which they “continue, often with ABA support, to resist 
federal ‘intrusions’”). 
 21. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 583 (“The organized bar typically op-
poses legislative or administrative initiatives that enlist lawyers as gatekee-
pers . . . because the bar views the initiators as unwelcome ‘intruders’ on the 
traditional turf of professional ‘self-regulation.’”); David B. Wilkins, Who 
Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 812–13 (1992) (“For more 
than a century, bar officials asserted that ‘self-regulation’ was the only en-
forcement system compatible with the fact that lawyers are ‘independent pro-
fessionals.”’); cf. Barnhizer, supra note 19, at 217 (“Self-regulation is at the 
core of lawyers’ arguments that they should be entrusted with oversight of the 
behavior of lawyers, but self-regulation by lawyers and judges has not 
worked.”); Mark D. Nozette & Robert A. Creamer, Professionalism: The Next 
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This Article argues that the continued emphasis on lawyer 
self-regulation exacts costs. Conceiving of the disciplinary codes 
as mere professional self-regulation rather than as one element 
of an expansive regulatory regime governing the bar misleads 
courts, code drafters, lawyers, and laypersons alike. The myth 
of self-regulation has serious ramifications both for the devel-
opment of the law governing lawyers and for everyday legal 
practice. The Article therefore proposes an amendment to the 
Model Rules that would eliminate all reference to self-
regulation and replace it with a more accurate statement of the 
status of the professional codes.  
It is important, at the outset, to acknowledge that com-
mentators attribute various meanings to the term “self-
regulation.”22 Some commentators, recognizing that the power 
to discipline lawyers has shifted from bar organizations to state 
judiciaries, assume that lawyer-judges who supervise discipli-
nary cases are likely to give special solicitude to the interests of 
the bar.23 By their reasoning, any regulation which involves 
lawyers as contributors to, or in the enforcement of, the prevail-
ing norms is “self-regulation.”24 This Article, in contrast, pre-
 
Level, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1539, 1540 (2005) (characterizing self-regulation as a 
“core professional value”). 
 22. See F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Le-
gal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 194–95 (“[T]wo 
tasks are involved in the process of self-regulation: the task of monitoring con-
duct and the task of maintaining the quality of performance.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Margaret Onys Rentz, Laying Down the Law: Bringing Down 
the Legal Cartel in Real Estate Settlement Services and Beyond, 40 GA. L. REV. 
293, 307 (2005) (“[L]eniency in disciplinary action—a product of the bar’s self-
regulation—is no doubt part of what fuels public contempt for the profes-
sion.”); Sahl, supra note 10, at 74–75 (drawing a link between negative public 
perception of the bar and its sense that self-regulation through the discipli-
nary process is ineffective). 
 24. See Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests 
of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 455 (2008) (arguing that the reg-
ulation of lawyers “by lawyers/justices from the state supreme courts . . . has 
been exceptionally helpful to the legal profession as a whole”); Nancy J. Moore, 
The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7, 15 (noting that 
supervising courts “are comprised of judges, who are not only members of the 
broader legal profession, but also former (and potentially future) practicing 
lawyers. . . . As a result, the legal profession has achieved a degree of self-
regulation far beyond . . . the expectations of any other professional group”); 
Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional 
Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 917, 921−22 (discussing self-
regulation in terms of bar enforcement of admission requirements and the dis-
ciplinary codes); cf. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 22, at 197 (“Perhaps the 
best way to understand the present status of professional self-regulation is to 
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supposes that judges overseeing lawyers take their indepen-
dence from the bar and their regulatory functions seriously. 
The Article therefore treats discipline by courts as a form of 
regulation external to the profession.25 Even if this were not 
the case, however, the Article’s core point would remain, be-
cause judicial enforcement of the disciplinary codes is only one 
of many forms of regulation governing the bar.  
This Article’s goal is narrow: to highlight the various ad-
verse consequences that arise when different actors in the sys-
tem—including the co-regulators of the bar, lawyers them-
selves, and the public—cling to an image of self-regulation. The 
consequences may seem inconsistent. Sometimes, for example, 
thinking in terms of self-regulation creates a self-fulfilling 
prophecy in which an external regulator fails to adequately ex-
ercise its authority to constrain the bar. Identifying the regula-
tor’s misperception can help produce a change in its practices. 
At other times, however, the image of self-regulation may lead 
an external regulator to falsely assume that a different regula-
tor has deferred to the bar, causing it to undervalue the other 
regulator’s actions. Eliminating that misconception may be a 
prerequisite to properly dividing up the work of the co-
regulators. In yet other circumstances, the persistent image of 
self-regulation affects the ways in which lawyers respond to le-
gal ethics codes and members of the public respond to profes-
sional regulation as a whole. To the extent their responses are 
misguided or undermine the effectiveness of professional regu-
lation, clarifying the reality that law is heavily regulated by 
multiple co-regulators can mute these reactions. This Article 
 
observe the difference between the enunciated standards of performance and 
conduct . . . and the reality of disciplinary enforcement.”).  
 25. As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 80−84, in the days 
before the adoption of the 1983 Model Rules, professional discipline was not a 
vibrant enterprise. See ABEL, supra note 19, at 144 (noting that contemporary 
lawyers “suffer few informal sanctions for violating ethical rules” and suggest-
ing that formal disciplinary processes are not very effective). In modern times, 
however, the threat of disciplinary sanction is real, bar prosecutors take them-
selves seriously, and courts routinely evaluate the conduct of lawyers through 
the disciplinary process. See Symposium, Lessons from Enron: A Symposium 
on Corporate Governance, 54 MERCER L. REV. 683, 711 (2003) (statement of 
A.P. Carlton) (“It has [been] for 200 years the judicial branch of the states that 
discipline lawyers. It’s not self-regulation as it’s often spoken of. It’s regulation 
by the third party judicial branch or a statutory body in most states.” (altera-
tion in original)); National Organization of Bar Counsel, History of the Na-
tional Organization of Bar Counsel, http://www.nobc.org/history.aspx (last vi-
sited Mar. 11, 2009) (describing the history of coordinated efforts by bar 
counsel). 
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does not propose solutions to each of the adverse consequences 
that the self-regulation myth produces,26 but rather attempts to 
set the table for solutions by identifying the core misconception 
and its consequences. 
Part I of the Article clarifies why the notion of law as a 
self-regulated industry developed and how it became archaic. 
The history helps explain why the Model Rule drafters continue 
to emphasize the concept. Part II highlights the reality that law 
has become a heavily regulated industry in modern times. Al-
though lawyers may contribute to the law governing the bar by 
helping to develop rules and participating in the cases and leg-
islative processes that produce substantive law constraining 
the bar, lawyers do not control the outcomes. Part III addresses 
the heart of this Article’s thesis by describing the impact of con-
tinued reliance on the notion of self-regulation. In light of the 
resulting costs, Part IV suggests, and describes the potential 
benefits of, an amendment to the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct that would begin to roll back the self-regulation myth.  
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF  
AMERICAN LAWYERS   
There have always been lawyers in America, and many 
played a critical role in the founding of the country.27 Most ear-
ly American lawyers trained in England28 or apprenticed with 
 
 26. That is not to say that the author has no views on the subjects of deal-
ing with self-interested professional regulation, the need to harmonize co-
regulation, or the appropriate distribution of the work of regulating lawyers. 
See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 312–14 (2006) (discussing self-
interested professional rules); Fred C. Zacharias, The Humanization of Law-
yers, PROF. LAW., 2002 Symposium Issue, at 9, 26–31 (discussing the appro-
priate distribution of the work of regulating lawyers); Zacharias & Green, su-
pra note 4, (manuscript at 52–60) (discussing the importance of harmonizing 
various forms of judicial regulation of lawyers). 
 27. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN 
TIMES 177–78 (1953) (“Twenty-five of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of 
Independence were lawyers.”); id. at 186 (discussing some of the great lawyers 
of the post-revolutionary period). 
 28. See W. HAMILTON BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779−1979, 
at 8–9 (1982) (identifying lawyers in colonial Virginia who attended the Brit-
ish Inns of Court and suggesting that the number decreased over time); 1 AN-
TON-HERMAN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 33 
(1965) (discussing American lawyers who were trained in the British Inns of 
Court); E. ALFRED JONES, AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE INNS OF COURT ix−xxx 
(1924) (noting the number of American lawyers who trained in the British 
Inns of Court during the Revolutionary period); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY 
OF THE AMERICAN BAR 188 (1966) (noting that many colonial lawyers “received 
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lawyers who originally learned their skills in the motherland.29 
There were no American professional law schools as we know 
them today, although a few universities endowed individual 
chairs of law in their undergraduate colleges.30 Bar organiza-
tions and rules of ethics governing lawyers simply did not ex-
ist.31 Any regulation of lawyers came from judges exercising 
their authority to admit lawyers to practice in their courts;32 
these judges could forbid lawyers to appear, sanction them for 
 
their legal education in London in the Inns of Court”); cf. David D. Garner, 
Comment, The Continuing Vitality of the Case Method in the Twenty-First 
Century, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307, 309 (discussing the English training of 
lawyers in colonial times, but noting that “after the Revolution, legal educa-
tion by this method steadily declined in popularity in favor of the increasingly 
available and less expensive domestic alternatives”). 
 29. See MARIAN C. MCKENNA, TAPPING REEVE AND THE LITCHFIELD LAW 
SCHOOL 1, 9 (1986) (discussing the practice of apprenticeships in the early 
American legal profession); Daniel R. Coquillette, The Legal Education of a 
Patriot: Josiah Quincy Jr.’s Law Commonplace (1763), 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 317, 
319–21 (2007) (identifying apprenticeships chronicled by noted early-American 
lawyers); Charles R. McKirdy, The Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in 
Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 124, 125 (1977) (dis-
cussing the early apprenticeship process); cf. POUND, supra note 27, at 178 
(noting that “a large number of the older and stronger lawyers were loyalists 
and left the country or ceased to practice,” leaving legal practice “in the hands 
of lawyers of a lower type and of less ability and training”). 
 30. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Le-
gal Education, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 527 (1990) (discussing Thomas 
Jefferson’s institution of a chair in “Law and Police” at William and Mary in 
1779). The first full university law school was Harvard, which was established 
in 1817, but its fortunes promptly declined. See Coquillette, supra note 29, at 
323; see also John H. Langbein, Blackstone, Litchfield, and Yale: The Found-
ing of Yale Law School, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL 17, 17–36 (An-
thony T. Kronman ed., 2004) (discussing the evolution of Yale Law School from 
its origins as a proprietary institution to its formal association with Yale in 
the 1820s). 
 31. See POUND, supra note 27, at 201−15, 223−32, 243 (discussing the ear-
liest, often unsuccessful, bar associations and concluding that “[n]one of the 
associations listed as organized before 1850 left permanent records and they 
all seem to have had only a temporary existence”); Carol Rice Andrews, Stan-
dards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800 Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 
1420 (2004) (“[B]ar associations themselves were rare and their rules related 
only marginally to substantive practice standards.”).  
 32. See, e.g., 2 CHROUST, supra note 28, at 250 (noting that the New York 
State Constitution of 1777 required ‘“all attorneys . . . be appointed by the 
court . . . and be regulated by the rules and orders of the said courts’” (quoting 
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXVII (1802))); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN 
LEGAL ETHICS 53 (1986) [hereinafter WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS] 
(“[D]isciplinary control was dispersed among local courts.”); Charles W. Wol-
fram, Towards a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics—I. Ori-
gins, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469, 474 (2001) (discussing the history 
and procedure of judicial regulation of lawyers). 
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litigation misconduct, or punish them in more indirect ways.33 
No formal or uniform standards governing lawyer behavior or 
judicial evaluation of lawyer practice were evident. 
Thus, in the post-revolutionary period of the United States, 
law truly was a self-regulated profession. Faced with a vacuum 
of regulatory institutions and standards of conduct, it was nat-
ural that informal norms of practice developed. Lawyers talked 
to each other, visited in groups at local inns and eating clubs, 
and depended on each other for reciprocal courtesy that made 
the practice of law dignified, civil, and relatively efficient.34 Col-
legial assumptions about the profession developed, such as the 
fact that lawyers should act as gentlemen and that gentlemen 
should not betray their clients’ secrets.35 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the profession’s 
internal debate about how it should behave blossomed. Propo-
nents of Henry Lord Brougham’s view of an ultra-aggressive 
adversary system36 clashed with adherents to David Hoffman’s 
 
 33. See, e.g., Ex Parte Steinman & Hensel, 95 Pa. 220, 237 (1880) (“We 
entertain no doubt that a court has jurisdiction . . . to strike the name of an 
attorney from the roll in a proper case.”); Andrews, supra note 31, at 1417 
(noting several early statutes “providing for judicial disbarment of lawyers in 
cases of deceit or malpractice”); cf. POUND, supra note 27, at 185 (“Discipline 
by the courts was invoked only in rare and extreme cases.”). 
 34. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS, supra note 32, at 34 (describing 
the evolution of bar associations from local eating clubs); Hopkins, supra note 
18, at 862 n.87 (“[T]he country’s earliest bar associations . . . were primarily 
established as avenues for fellowship.”). 
 35. See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2400 (2003) (“[T]he Canons were animated by the 
vision of a self-regulating profession in which lawyers engaged in their profes-
sional activities as gentlemen.”); William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professio-
nalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. 
L. REV. 485, 510 (1995) (“Drawing on the model of an idealized English gen-
tlemanly class, the legal profession attempted to create a public image of law-
yers as a class of gentlemen.”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspec-
tive on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978) 
(“[S]ome of the early cases express the idea that the privilege was that of the 
lawyer (a gentleman does not give away matters confided to him).”); Russell G. 
Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, 
Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1348 (2006) 
(“Americans transformed the English notion of lawyers as gentlemen by class 
into a conception of lawyers as gentlemen as a moral badge of their ability to 
rise above self-interest, whatever their class origin.”). 
 36. See 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (Joseph Nightingale ed., J. Robins 
& Co. Albion Press 1821) (reporting Lord Brougham’s famous statement: “An 
advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, 
and that person is his client”).  
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Fifty Resolutions of Professional Deportment,37 which empha-
sized moral considerations over client orientation.38 Courts, 
continuing to provide the only formal regulation, tended to take 
a middle-ground position in the debate about lawyers’ ethics, 
but only in the context of individual cases.39 Lawyers, for the 
most part, were left to formulate their own views regarding ap-
propriate behavior.40 
Three developments in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries began to give structure to the profession and 
professional norms. First, professional law schools, which 
opened in fits and starts throughout the nineteenth century, 
took hold and began to impart a shared experience to larger 
numbers of the bar.41 Second, around the turn of the twentieth 
century, central bar examining boards became more common, 
creating a mandate of education that helped regularize prac-
 
 37. See DAVID HOFFMAN, Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional De-
portment, in A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 751, 752−75 (2d ed. 1836), reprinted 
in HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 338−51 (2d prtg. 1954).  
 38. See, e.g., id. at 338 (Resolution I) (“I will never permit professional 
zeal to carry me beyond the limits of sobriety and decorum.”); id. (Resolution 
II) (“I will espouse no man’s cause out of envy hatred, or malice toward his an-
tagonist.”); id. at 339 (Resolution X) (“Should my client be disposed to insist on 
captious requisitions, or frivolous and vexatious defenses, they shall be neither 
enforced nor countenanced by me.”); id. at 340 (Resolution XIV) (“My client’s 
conscience and my own are distinct entities.”); id. at 346 (Resolution XXXIII) 
(“What is morally wrong cannot be professionally right.”). For a discussion of 
the Brougham-Hoffman debate and the surrounding historical context, see 
Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–4, 24–30 (2005).  
 39. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 38, at 30–35 (discussing one nine-
teenth-century court’s analysis of the responsibilities and regulation of law-
yers’ conduct).  
 40. See Pearce, supra note 35, at 1349–50 (discussing the nineteenth-
century debate about the ethical obligations of lawyers). 
 41. See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES O. PORTER, THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER: A SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 167–70 
(1954) (discussing the introduction of the case method into legal education); 
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850S TO THE 1980S 73−84 (1983) (discussing the rise of American law 
schools); Coquillette, supra note 29, at 324 (discussing the development of the 
Harvard curriculum in the 1870s and arguing that its influence on the “intel-
lectual development of modern American lawyers has been profound. ‘Think-
ing like a lawyer’ has been defined by this educational experience for a cen-
tury.”); Gallagher, supra note 35, at 512 (“[B]y the mid-nineteenth century bar 
associations were eclipsed in many respects by the development of the modern 
law school.”). 
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tice.42 Third, and most importantly, bar associations began to 
develop43—partly in reaction to the uncertainty spawned by the 
ongoing debate regarding the role of lawyers and partly as an 
effort by elite lawyers to raise the economic and social status of 
the bar organizations’ members.44 
 
 42. See Michael Bard & Barbara A. Bamford, The Bar: Professional Asso-
ciation or Medieval Guild?, 19 CATH. U. L. REV. 393, 395 (1970) (noting that 
between 1870 and 1920, most states created central examination boards).  
  In the early period, judges sometimes administered oral examinations 
as a prerequisite to practice. See ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR 
THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 101 (1921) (finding that by 1870, twenty-
nine jurisdictions had courts, judges, or ad hoc committees conducting oral ex-
aminations); Paul T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the (National Standardized) 
Test: Tracing the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1315 (2003) 
(noting that oral exams were required in New Jersey as early as 1755). Many 
states, however, offered admission to practice without proof of skills or know-
ledge. See MICHAEL BURRAGE, REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE CON-
TEMPORARY LEGAL PROFESSION 153 (2006) (noting a movement in the early 
nineteenth century “to reduce, and then eliminate altogether, the require-
ments that had formerly governed admission to the bar”); Hayden, supra at 
1314–15 (citing Indiana’s pre-1932 constitutional provision that “Every person 
of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to prac-
tice law in all courts of justice”); see also POUND, supra note 27, at 182 (“All 
states made admission easy with a minimum of qualification.”); Francis L. 
Wellman, Admission to the Bar, 15 AM. L. REV 295, 298 (1881) (finding that by 
1870 “[a] mass of persons had been admitted to the profession without any lib-
eral education, with barely the rudiments of English grammar, sometimes 
without being able to pronounce the language, and with such a smattering of 
law as could be gained by reading Blackstone a few months”). In 1855, Massa-
chusetts became the first state to administer a written bar examination, but 
this effort apparently was short-lived. See 2 CHROUST, supra note 28, at 
231−32 (discussing the loosening of standards for admission to the Massachu-
setts bar); REED, supra at 101 n.3 (concluding that the Massachusetts’ re-
quirement lasted only until 1859); WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS, supra note 32, 
at 198 (noting Massachusetts’ original bar exam). New York adopted an ex-
amination involving both written and oral components in 1877. Robert M. Jar-
vis, An Anecdotal History of the Bar Exam, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 359, 374 
(1996) (noting New York’s adoption of the examination). Soon thereafter, Ida-
ho and Nevada began experimenting with written tests. Id. Many states 
adopted such tests in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See 
Hayden, supra at 1317 (discussing the development of written bar examina-
tions).  
 43. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE 
LAW MAKERS 286 (1950) (reporting that eight city and eight state bar associa-
tions formed between the foundation of the New York city bar in 1870 and the 
establishment of the American Bar Association in 1878); Philip J. Wickser, 
Bar Associations, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 390, 396 (1930) (“Almost all bar associa-
tions, as we know them today, have been organized since 1870.”).  
 44. See, e.g., Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary 
Procedures in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 918 (1994) (find-
ing that the elimination of formal training requirements during the era of 
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Bar associations represented the modern form of lawyer 
self-regulation. Local bar organizations reflecting loose associa-
tions of lawyers had existed for a long time.45 A few of these ex-
ercised some control over local admission of lawyers to practice, 
but most did not.46 The first major bar association, the Bar of 
the City of New York, came into being in 1870,47 soon followed 
in 1878 by the ABA,48 a purportedly national bar organization 
with the avowed purpose of elevating the image of the profes-
sion.49 State bar associations subsequently continued to devel-
op,50 usually consisting of successful, like-minded lawyers who 
hoped to influence the way society viewed and regulated the 
profession.51 They were a natural reaction to the development 
of bar examinations and increasing judicial regulation. 
Legal ethics codes became the primary mechanism by 
which these private organizations of lawyers could have input 
into what courts were saying about the lawyer’s role. The first 
formal code was adopted in Alabama in 1887.52 The first ABA 
 
Jacksonian democracy created concerns over a lack of professional control and, 
ultimately, led to the formation of local bar associations in the 1870s). 
 45. A few bar associations existed during the colonial period, but most of 
these disbanded by the early nineteenth century. See BURRAGE, supra note 42, 
at 257 (“Every existing bar association except one collapsed.”); Andrews, supra 
note 31, at 1434 (“Local bar associations formed sporadically during the co-
lonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century.”); Elizabeth 
Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, a Case Study, 69 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 817, 829 (2000) (finding that the “colonial bar associations, having lost 
their de facto control over admission, eventually ‘crumbled and disappeared’” 
after the Revolutionary War (citation omitted)); Devlin, supra note 44, at 918 
(noting hostility to the bar as a group that began in the 1830s and lasted to 
the end of the Civil War).  
 46. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 35, at 512−13 (discussing the early 
pre- and post-Revolutionary War bar associations and their attempts to con-
trol admission to the profession); Wickser, supra note 43, at 393–94 (describ-
ing hostile reactions to early bar associations’ attempts to regulate the legal 
profession). 
 47. Wickser, supra note 43, at 396. 
 48. WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS, supra note 32, at 34. 
 49. See HURST, supra note 43, at 287 (noting that the ABA sought to raise 
the economic and social status of lawyers, especially its members). 
 50. See id. (finding that twenty state or territorial bar associations had 
established by 1890; forty by 1900; forty-eight by 1916; and all states and ter-
ritories had some sort of association by 1925); Wickser, supra note 43, at 400 
(discussing the existence of more than 650 state and local bar associations na-
tionwide, in practically every state, by 1916). 
 51. See, e.g., Wickser, supra note 43, at 396 (noting that the New York 
Bar’s purpose was, according to its constitution, “to maintain the honor and 
dignity of the profession”).  
 52. ALA. STATE BAR ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS (1887), reprinted in 2 ALA. 
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model code, the Canons of Ethics, was adopted in 1908.53 Al-
though these codes had no legal force, they were intended to 
guide lawyers and influence judges about the content of lawyer 
responsibilities.54 Over time, courts increasingly looked to the 
Canons as establishing norms for the profession.55 
These developments emboldened the leaders of the legal 
profession and led to an effort in the early twentieth century to 
formalize lawyer self-regulation. Local bar associations grew, 
increasing their political clout, and eventually sought to exer-
cise legal control over the profession.56 In the 1920s, a move-
ment began to produce court rules or statutes requiring all 
practicing lawyers to belong to state bar organizations.57 This 
allowed the organizations to collect fees, control (and limit) 
admission to the bar, and participate in the discipline of law-
yers.58 Some states developed deferential practices by which 
 
LAW. 245, 259 (1941); see also Carol Rice Andrews, The Lasting Legacy of the 
1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, in GILDED AGE LE-
GAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES’ 1887 CODE AND THE REGULA-
TION OF THE PROFESSION 7, 7 (Carol Rice Andrews et al. eds., 2003) (identify-
ing the Alabama code as “the first code of its kind”). 
 53. AM. BAR ASS’N, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). 
 54. See Jacob M. Dickinson, Address of the President, 33 A.B.A. REP. 341, 
356 (1908) (statement of the ABA president expressing his hope that states 
would adopt and enforce the 1908 canons). 
 55. See Altman, supra note 35, at 2395−96 (cataloguing state adoptions of 
the Canons and noting their hegemony); Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions 
Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 327 (2002) (noting that state courts often deferred to lo-
cal bar associations for both ethical standards and their enforcement). 
 56. See Gallagher, supra note 35, at 517−21 (discussing the 
“[i]nstitutionalization of [c]ollegial [c]ontrol” in the early twentieth century); 
Joy, supra note 55, at 327 (discussing the increasing role of bar associations 
around the turn of the century). 
 57. See HURST, supra note 43, at 292 (discussing the movement towards 
integrated bars); WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS, supra note 32, at 36 n.6 (“North 
Dakota’s was the first bar integrated, by legislation, in 1921.”). 
 58. See HURST, supra note 43, at 292 (suggesting that the model of an “en-
forced, all inclusive membership of lawyers in one organization” sought to re-
place voluntary bar organizations’ historical lack of authority over laypersons 
and inability to set norms for the profession). By 1930, seven states had man-
datory bars and within three years that number rose to eighteen. Barton, su-
pra note 19, at 432 n.77. By 1954, twenty-five states had integrated bars. Id. 
(citing BLAUSTEIN & PORTER, supra 41, at 240−41). As of 2007, thirty-three 
American jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) are integrated. 
UNIFIED BARS, ISSUES UPDATE 1 (2007), http://www.abanet.org/barserv/ 
issuesupdate/updates07/unifiedbars.pdf. 
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they placed at least the initial stage of professional discipline 
directly in the hands of state and local bar associations.59 
Bar organizations increasingly focused their mission on 
elevating the status of law as a profession, partly in the hope 
that self-regulation of the profession would prevent outside 
regulators from treating lawyers as ordinary businessmen.60 
These efforts culminated in the promulgation of the ABA’s 
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969,61 which replaced 
the vague Canons of Ethics with a set of relatively precise 
norms that looked more like enforceable regulatory constraints 
on lawyer behavior.62 Virtually all of the states adopted the 
Code as law and began to use it as a disciplinary mechanism.63 
Thus developed the model for modern self-regulation. The 
profession itself established the norms governing lawyers. Al-
though the professional codes were enforced through state dis-
ciplinary mechanisms, the state supreme courts (and in some 
cases the legislatures) adopted the bar-promulgated norms un-
questioningly and, in some instances, used local bar associa-
 
 59. See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discip-
line, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 14 (2007) (“By the early 1930s, the courts or 
legislatures in many states had conferred on bar associations express authori-
ty to investigate complaints, subpoena power to conduct investigations, and 
the authority to impose certain types of discipline sanctions.” (footnotes omit-
ted)); see also Joy, supra note 55, at 327 (suggesting that between 1908 and 
1969, “the regulation of lawyers was essentially the sole domain of bar associ-
ations”).  
In 1909, Illinois became the first jurisdiction officially recognizing the 
bar’s duty to supervise and discipline members of the bar, with California fol-
lowing suit twelve years later. ORIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CON-
DUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 96, 104−05 (1952). The California Supreme 
Court eventually recognized the bar as an administrative agency of the court, 
overturning bar decisions only in cases involving an honest difference of opi-
nion. Id. at 100. For the next forty years, it was typical for bar organizations to 
be the first to handle lawyer disciplinary complaints despite the fact that 
courts usually retained “the exclusive power to suspend or disbar.” Levin, su-
pra at 15−16. 
 60. See Gallagher, supra note 35, at 529 (discussing how self-regulation 
privileges lawyers over other professions that are often regulated by the legis-
lature). 
 61. AM. BAR ASS’N, CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1969). 
 62. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 
1239, 1251 (1991) (“[W]hereas the Canons and the Ethical Considerations 
represented fraternal understandings that memorialized a shared group dis-
course, the DR’s functioned as a statute defining the legal contours of a voca-
tion whose practitioners were connected primarily by having been licensed to 
practice law.”). 
 63. See WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS, supra note 32, at 56 (stating that by 
1972 all but three jurisdictions had adopted the code). 
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tions and private volunteers to enforce those norms.64 Moreo-
ver, because of limited resources, instances of professional dis-
cipline were relatively rare and unpublicized.65 To this point, 
other forms of lawyer regulation, such as malpractice liability, 
were muted or altogether non-existent.66 
II.  CHANGES IN LAWYER SELF-REGULATION AND THE 
ROAD TO THE STATUS QUO   
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all the 
changes that affected the legal profession in the late twentieth 
century, or the reasons for those changes.67 The most signifi-
cant include the due process revolution,68 the changing demo-
graphics of the bar69 and economics of legal practice (including 
the growth of corporate firms),70 and the development of the 
 
 64. See Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy in the Field of 
Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 49 (2005) (discussing the use of volunteer 
prosecutors to enforce attorney discipline in the mid-twentieth century); see 
also AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON THE EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCE-
MENT 19 (1970) (final draft) [hereinafter CLARK REPORT] (criticizing the use of 
volunteer attorneys). 
 65. See ABEL, supra note 19, at 146−51 (describing the absence of effective 
discipline through the early 1980s); Levin, supra note 59, at 14 (“When bar 
associations became involved in lawyer discipline, the discipline process and 
the sanctions imposed became considerably more private.”); Janine C. Ogando, 
Note, Sanctioning Unfit Lawyers: The Need for Public Protection, 5 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 459, 468 (1991) (“Statistical information was almost impossible 
to get because either no records were kept, or the quality and extent of the 
records were inconsistent.”).  
 66. Cf. ABEL, supra note 19, at 150−51 (discussing successful claimants’ 
difficulty in getting damages because their only recourse was against attor-
neys who would often claim bankruptcy to avoid paying damages). 
 67. See Fischer, supra note 1, at 96 (offering explanations for the “sea of 
change in attitudes toward the regulation of lawyers” that occurred in the lat-
ter half of the twentieth century); Gallagher, supra note 35, at 504−07 (dis-
cussing the theoretical explanations for the “progression from a ‘gentlemanly’ 
to a modern elite profession”).  
 68. For a discussion of the effect of the due-process revolution on the legal 
profession and its approach to professional norms, see Fred C. Zacharias, Re-
conciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 
1318−22 (1995). 
 69. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 538 (3d 
ed. 2005) (discussing the changing numbers of women and minorities entering 
the bar after the 1960s); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 315−19 (2005) (discussing the growth of the 
legal profession and changing demographics of Chicago lawyers between 1975 
and 1995). 
 70. See AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE 
BAR, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 3−4 (1996) (noting that 
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regulatory state.71 What is significant, for our purposes, is that 
by the time the ABA attended to its next model code, the Model 
Rules, the world of law practice had been transformed. Outside 
regulators—especially the courts—had begun to question the 
profession’s practices and to think of law as simply another 
business potentially needing regulation.72 
Against this background, the drafters of the Model Rules 
clung to the hope of its self-regulatory model; namely, that the 
development of carefully crafted but voluntary professional 
codes would fend off outside regulation of the bar.73 The ABA’s 
expectations, however, were short-lived. The process of drafting 
the Model Rules drew far more media attention than any past 
attempt at self-regulation.74 The Model Rules were publicly de-
bated and produced substantial disagreement.75 Because of the 
 
“[c]hanges in economics of the practice of law” have “converted law practice 
from a profession to a business”); John M. Conley, How Bad Is It out There?: 
Teaching and Learning About the State of the Legal Profession in North Caro-
lina, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1943, 1966−67 (2004) (discussing the “evolution of pri-
vate-firm practice . . . from 1960 to 1995 . . . including the growth in law firm 
size; the changing economics of law practice, . . . and the consequent difficulty 
of balancing personal and professional lives.” (citing MICHAEL TROTTER, PROF-
IT AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW: WHAT’S HAPPENED TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
81−100 (1997))); Robert A. Stein, The Future of the Legal Profession, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) (“The management and economics of law practice have also 
changed dramatically [in the late twentieth century].”). 
 71. Presumably, as the federal and state governments increased regulato-
ry oversight of the overall American economy, the business of law became fair-
er game as well. See Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsi-
bility: Towards Binding Norms of Corporate Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 171, 177 n.24 (2007) (noting that more than fifty-five new federal agencies 
were created between the 1960s and the 1980s). 
 72. The United States Supreme Court, for example, applied antitrust doc-
trines to bar regulations. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 
(1975). The Court also protected legal advertising. See Bates v. State Bar of 
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). Pressed by organizations, such as the Con-
sumers Union, that sought to demystify the profession by gathering and pub-
lishing information about legal practice, lower courts questioned professional 
rules that maintained the guild. See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. 
Am. Bar Ass’n, 505 F. Supp. 822, 823−24 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff ’d in part, rev’d in 
part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 218 (4th Cir. 1982) (upholding a claim, in 
theory, that a bar rule forbidding publication of an attorney directory was un-
constitutional). 
 73. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl.; see also ABEL, supra 
note 19, at 142 (“Self-regulation . . . helped stave off state regulation.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 
695−701, 734 (1989) (describing public attention focused on the adoption of the 
Model Rules). 
 75. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked 
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dissent, as states began to consider the new code, they took 
their role in adopting (or refusing to adopt) its provisions more 
seriously.76 Unlike with the Model Code, which was adopted 
promptly and almost unanimously,77 the various American ju-
risdictions split sharply in their approaches to the Model 
Rules.78 Some accepted the proposed rules wholesale, some tin-
kered with the new provisions, and others retained—in part or 
completely—the older Model Code.79 
This new regulatory independence was not superficial. In 
the past, states had failed to take the supervision of lawyers se-
riously in several ways.80 Not only did they accept the ABA’s 
substantive proposals unquestioningly, but they also devoted 
extremely limited resources to enforcement of the rules.81 Per-
sonnel friendly to the bar dominated disciplinary prosecu-
tions.82 Reports regarding discipline, which might have pro-
vided a common law defining appropriate behavior of lawyers, 
were virtually absent.83 This all changed after the adoption of 
the Model Rules, with its surrounding publicity.84 
 
About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 243–44 
(1985) (discussing the controversy surrounding the proposed Model Rules). 
 76. See id. at 243. 
 77. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 78. See, e.g., Michael H. Rubin, Uniform Rules, Non-Uniform Solutions, 
49 LA. B.J. 362, 362 (“Noticeably absent from the move towards uniformity, 
however, is the treatment by states of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”). 
 79. See id.  
 80. See generally Marks & Cathcart, supra note 22 (reporting inadequa-
cies in the processes used by pre-1974 disciplinary agencies). 
 81. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 64, at 19–23. The deficiencies in the 
early disciplinary processes were first noted by an ABA committee chaired by 
retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark. See generally id. 
 82. See id. at 24 (criticizing the existing disciplinary processes of agencies 
whose “members . . . are required to pass judgment on the conduct of attorneys 
with whom they are personally acquainted”); Devlin, supra note 44, at 920 (as-
serting that the “‘bar police[d] its own ranks’” (quoting GLENN R. WINTERS, 
BAR ASSOCIATION ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES: A HANDBOOK FOR BAR AS-
SOCIATION OFFICERS 6 (1954)) (alteration in original)); Marks & Cathcart, su-
pra note 22, at 224 (reporting a 1974 study of disciplinary agencies, criticizing 
the lack of resources in many, and concluding that “the presence of profession-
al staff in a disciplinary agency increases the probability that the staff will 
perceive its constituency as broader than the agency, or even broader than the 
bar”); Steele & Nimmer, supra note 24, at 924 (“Most professional discipline, 
however, is conducted by part-time volunteer committees of local lawyers 
working out of their own offices.”).  
 83. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY 
ENFORCEMENT, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 34 (1992) [herei-
nafter MCKAY REPORT] (finding that prior to the Clark Report, most jurisdic-
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Spurred in part by the ABA’s Clark Report,85 states began 
to treat the discipline of lawyers as a significant enterprise.86 
State supreme courts took control of the disciplinary process in 
almost all of the states.87 Enforcement resources increased.88 
 
tions kept all proceedings secret until the state high court issued an order 
finding misconduct and that even thereafter records could usually be sealed by 
complainants or respondents who sought a protective order); Fred C. Zacha-
rias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the 
Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 238 n.45 
(1993) (“Until recently, opinions of the bar and bar disciplinary committees 
were extremely difficult to identify. Few states collected or indexed decisions 
in a published format.”); cf. Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer 
Discipline and “Disclosure Advertising”: Towards a New Ethos, 72 N.C. L. REV 
351, 358 (1994) (“[C]urrent practices of disseminating the names and details of 
lawyer discipline range from nonexistent to thoroughly systematic to random-
ly hit-or-miss.”); Levin, supra note 59, at 2 (“[E]ven today, much of the lawyer 
discipline process in many states remains secret.”). 
 84. See Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to 
Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1280 (1998) (“The transition from 
Code to Rules marked a fundamental shift in expectations for legal ethics. . . . 
[T]he organized bar relinquished the ambition of articulating a unified state-
ment of professional ideals in favor of clearly stating the enforceable legal ob-
ligations of lawyers. . . . [B]y forsaking professional aspirations in favor of the 
‘law of lawyering,’ the bar accelerated the demise of self-regulation, opening 
the door wide to regulatory forays by outside governmental agencies.”). 
 85. CLARK REPORT, supra note 64.  
 86. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 35, at 490 (noting that the California 
legislature, in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, “criticized the Bar for having a 
discipline system that was perceived to be slow, unresponsive, and overly pro-
tective of the interests of lawyers rather than the public interest[,]” which 
“culminated in a threat by the Legislature to divest the Bar of its self-
regulatory powers”). 
 87. See Joy, supra note 55, at 374 (“In the last thirty years, there has been 
a slow but significant change in lawyer disciplinary systems as a growing 
number of state supreme courts have taken exclusive control of the discipli-
nary process.”); Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About 
the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 
3 (1998) (“Since the Clark Report, the ultimate responsibility for the adminis-
tration of lawyer discipline in most states has moved, at least nominally, from 
the state bars to the state courts.”); Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship 
and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 37 n.24 (1996) (“[I]n 
some states . . . state or local bar associations have lost administrative control 
of the disciplinary system in favor of boards established by the state supreme 
court.”).  
 88. See Johnson, supra note 64, at 70 (finding that the “deplorable” condi-
tion in attorney discipline found by the Clark Commission no longer exists 
due, in part, to increased funding); Carol M. Langford & David M. M. Bell, 
Finding a Voice: The Legal Ethics Committee, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 855, 867 
(2002) (“[A]s a result of the groundbreaking recommendations of the Clark 
Committee and McKay Commission . . . state disciplinary systems are signifi-
cantly more professionalized, with increased funding and full-time profession-
al staff.”); Levin, supra note 87, at 4 (“Lawyer discipline systems are better 
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Disciplinary prosecution offices were reorganized and bols-
tered.89 States revised their disciplinary procedures, in some 
instances introducing lay participation in the process90 and, in 
one case, establishing separate, independent courts as over-
seers.91 Most importantly, although the disciplinary processes 
in most instances remained confidential, decisions involving 
discipline became somewhat more accessible; decisions were 
reported in court reporters, bar journals, and legal newspapers 
in ways that made them easier to locate, categorize, and com-
pile.92  
The attraction of regulating lawyers was not confined to 
the disciplinary implementation of the professional rules. As 
medical malpractice liability expanded, the door opened to in-
 
funded . . . than they used to be.”). Of course, one can argue that disciplinary 
resources remain insufficient to be effective, but they are a far cry from the 
previous threshold. Cf. DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: RE-
FORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 158−60 (2000) (arguing that the inadequate 
resources devoted to discipline, among other problems, continue to undermine 
the project of self-regulation through discipline). 
 89. See, e.g., MCKAY REPORT, supra note 83, at xiv (stating that by 1992 
“almost all states” had a “professional disciplinary staff with statewide juris-
diction”); Gallagher, supra note 35, at 491 (“The resources expended on the 
discipline system [in California] were increased substantially, and the lawyer 
discipline bureaucracy was better staffed and organized.”). 
 90. See Devlin, supra note 44, at 928 (“By 1982, thirty-two states plus the 
District of Columbia had public members serving on their disciplinary agen-
cies.”); cf. ARIZ. STATE SENATE, FACT SHEET FOR S.C.R. 1005: PRACTICE OF 
LAW, REGULATION (1997), http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/43leg/1r/ 
summary/s.1005scr.grf.htm (proposing a constitutional amendment to estab-
lish a State Legal Professions Board authorized to regulate the practice of law 
in Arizona and consisting of a majority of nonattorney members). 
 91. See Gallagher, supra note 35, at 590−93 (describing the evolution of 
the California State Bar Court and its various features); The State Bar Court 
of California, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/sbc_generic.jsp?cid=13469 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (“California is the only state in the nation with in-
dependent professional judges dedicated to ruling on attorney discipline cas-
es.”). 
 92. Thirty to forty years ago, disciplinary decisions were virtually imposs-
ible to locate, other than the few abstracted in never-updated books. Over the 
ensuing decades, disciplinary decision-making has remained relatively pri-
vate, but many jurisdictions at least include abbreviated reports in local bar 
periodicals. See DeGraw & Burton, supra note 83, at 357–58 (noting that 
“most lawyer discipline has been invisible, although some slight movement 
toward openness has occurred in recent years” and describing how states cur-
rently report disciplinary decisions); Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do 
When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of 
Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 1010 n.171 (2002) 
(discussing ways in which disciplinary decisions are reported today).  
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creased legal malpractice litigation.93 Courts soon found them-
selves presiding over a significant regime of common law regu-
lation of the bar, including malpractice, breach of fiduciary du-
ty, and contract law.94 
Trial court supervision of lawyers in the course of litiga-
tion, which was recognized even in the early periods of the 
American legal profession,95 increased during this period as 
well. Part of the reason was the dramatic expansion of 
scorched-earth legal practices by corporate law firms able to 
devote time and resources to satellite litigation that hig-
hlighted lawyer misbehavior—including motions to disqualify96 
and motions for sanctions under Rule 1197 and similar sta-
tutes.98  
 
 93. See Gary A. Munneke & Theresa E. Loscalzo, The Lawyer’s Duty to 
Keep Clients Informed: Establishing a Standard of Care in Professional Liabil-
ity Actions, 9 PACE L. REV. 391, 405 (1989) (“[D]evelopments in the field of le-
gal malpractice parallel changes in medical malpractice law.”); Manuel R. 
Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law Professors, 70 TUL. L. 
REV. 2583, 2590 (1996) (arguing that legal malpractice law should be reformed 
in ways similar to medical malpractice law). 
 94. See ABEL, supra note 19, at 154 (noting a dramatic increase in liability 
claims against lawyers starting in the late 1970s); George M. Cohen, Legal 
Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Eco-
nomic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 346, 350 (1997) (noting that breach 
of fiduciary obligations serves as a predicate for liability); Leubsdorf, supra 
note 1, at 102 (“The time has come to consider legal malpractice law as part of 
the system of lawyer regulation.”); see also id. at 153 n.213 (providing an ex-
ample of lawyer liability based on breach of contract). 
 95. See Andrews, supra note 52, at 11 (“Courts retained their ‘inherent 
authority’ to discipline or disbar lawyers for misconduct.”); Zacharias & Green, 
supra note 38, at 32−36 (discussing judicial regulation of attorney conduct in 
the nineteenth century). 
 96. James Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualifica-
tion, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 419, 432−33 (discussing tactical disqualifica-
tion motions); Ted Schneyer, Nostalgia in the Fifth Circuit: Holding the Line 
on Litigation Conflicts Through Federal Common Law, 16 REV. LITIG. 537, 542 
(1997) (“[I]t has become common for federal litigators to be charged with im-
proper conflicts.”). 
 97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (authorizing the imposition of sanctions upon 
lawyers for various misconduct in filing pleadings); see also Lonnie T. Brown, 
Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through Enhance-
ment of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1567 (2001) (“Em-
pirical studies of the impact of Rule 11 following the 1983 changes invariably 
reveal that the revisions spawned a veritable explosion of satellite litigation.”); 
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11: A Commentary 
on the Supreme Court’s 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 93, 107 (1993) (“[I]n the first nine 
years of practice under the 1983 Amendment [to Rule 11], there were some 
6,000 reported decisions under the rule, including 600 decisions by courts of 
appeals and four decisions by the Supreme Court.”); Lawrence C. Marshall et 
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 Criminal prosecutors, particularly federal prosecutors, 
increasingly targeted lawyers, thus producing yet another form 
of regulation.99 Lawyers no longer were perceived as immune 
from prosecution for acts committed while representing their 
clients.100 Recognizing that communications with clients in fur-
therance of criminal acts might not be privileged,101 lawyers 
were called to testify about their activities,102 opening the door 
to further prosecutions. 
At some point in this process, the conduct of lawyers be-
came a political issue. In his presidential campaign, for exam-
ple, George W. Bush blamed many of the country’s woes, in-
cluding high medical costs, corporate fraud, and economic 
stagnation, on misbehavior by trial lawyers.103 It therefore 
 
al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 943, 949−55 (1992) (sur-
veying districts in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and showing the fre-
quency of sanction motions after the 1983 amendments expanding Rule 11). 
 98. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 1 LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
§ 10.13, at 708 & n.3 (4th ed. 1996) (listing state statutes directed at litigation 
abuses); see also Cohen, supra note 94, at 350 (“[T]he expansion of third party 
liability, fiduciary obligation, disqualification motions, and Rule 11, to name a 
few, have turned professional responsibility from a quaint sideline to a busi-
ness necessity.”). 
 99. See, e.g., William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 
781, 873 (1988) (noting that criminal defense attorneys are being prosecuted 
with increasing frequency); Paul F. Rothstein, “Anything You Say May Be 
Used Against You”: A Proposed Seminar on the Lawyer’s Duty to Warn of Con-
fidentiality’s Limits in Today’s Post-Enron World, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 
1749 n.16 (2007) (“[T]here seems to be an increasing tendency to prosecute 
lawyers in connection with their client’s crimes . . . .”); Aviva Abramovsky, 
Comment, Traitors in Our Midst: Attorneys Who Inform on their Clients, 2 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 676, 686−89 (2000) (discussing the increased targeting of at-
torneys for potential federal prosecution and the attendant rise in attorney 
informants). 
 100. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1998) (discussing the different approaches adopted by 
courts in cases in which lawyers were prosecuted and/or disciplined for crimi-
nal behavior). 
 101. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Fallacy That Attorney-Client Privilege Has 
Been Eroded: Ramifications and Lessons for the Bar, PROF. LAW., 1999 Sym-
posium Issue, at 39, 41 (“The subpoenas typically seek unprivileged informa-
tion—often information excepted from privilege through the crime-fraud ex-
clusion.”). 
 102. See, e.g., Max D. Stern & David Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The 
Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 
1783, 1789 (1988) (noting the increasing number of attorney-subpoena cases); 
Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas 
of Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REV. 917, 919 & n.5 (1992) (“Over the past decade, 
prosecutors increasingly have resorted to the tactic of subpoenaing lawyers to 
appear as witnesses before the grand jury.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Ron Hutcheson, Trial Lawyers Get Bashed at Bush Economic 
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should come as no surprise that federal and state legislatures 
joined the regulatory frenzy. Many jurisdictions adopted laws 
directly regulating lawyer trust accounts.104 Congress approved 
a stronger Rule 11 designed to counteract excessive zeal by 
lawyers105 as well as specific legislation mandating rules of pro-
fessional behavior independent of the professional codes.106 
Perhaps most prominently, federal agencies imposed their 
own regulations on lawyers who appeared before them. During 
the banking crises of the 1970s and 1980s, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) targeted law firms for their behavior in 
representing banking institutions ultimately found wanting 
under federal law, forcing many to pay large administrative 
fines.107 But OTS was not alone; numerous agencies adopted 
rules setting standards for legal practice that did not always 
match the standards anticipated by the ABA in its self-
regulatory rules.108 That trend has continued with the SEC’s 
recent promulgation of rules under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
which the ABA contested fiercely.109 
 
Conference, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 16, 2004, at A02 (“A White House confe-
rence on the economy turned into a forum for bashing trial lawyers yesterday 
as President Bush and his allies demanded congressional action to limit law-
suits.”). 
 104. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (establishing 
rules for the safekeeping of client and third-party property); Philip F. Downey, 
Comment, Attorneys’ Trust Accounts: The Bar’s Role in the Preservation of 
Client Property, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 275, 279 n.32 (1988) (“As of June, 1986, near-
ly all states had adopted an IOLTA [Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts] pro-
gram, and several states had decided that compliance with the IOLTA re-
quirements would be mandatory (Arizona, California, Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, 
Washington, and Wisconsin).”). 
 105. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983), with FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1993) 
(amended to limit what was perceived to be an overexpansion of sanctions un-
der the 1983 amendments). 
 106. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (requir-
ing regulations governing securities lawyers). 
 107. See, e.g., Joyce A. Hughes, Law Firm Kaye, Scholer, Lincoln S&L and 
the OTS, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 177 (1993) (detailing the 
OTS campaign); Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS, Kaye Scholer Agree to Settle 
All Charges, OTS NEWS, Mar. 8, 1992, at 92–95 (describing the settlement se-
cured from the law firm Kaye Scholer LLP).  
 108. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 18–22 (citing a range of federal regula-
tions); see also ABEL, supra note 19, at 154 (“[H]alf the proceedings against 
lawyers initiated by the SEC between 1935 and 1980 were begun after 1975.”).  
 109. See, e.g., Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass’n, 
to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s74502/apcarlton1.htm (challenging rules proposed by the SEC pur-
suant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that limited a lawyer’s discretion when con-
fronted by a client corporation’s misconduct).  
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In short, the professional codes adopted by the ABA no 
longer are sufficient to foreclose other regulation and, indeed, 
do not represent self-regulation even in their own disciplinary 
enforcement. A variety of regulators external to the ABA—
including the courts—interpret, adjust, and enforce the rules 
and provide their own regulations when the prevailing profes-
sional code seems inadequate.110 At best, the codes are a form 
of co-regulation. More realistically, they are the profession’s in-
itial suggestions for partial standards that apply when other 
considerations and external regulation do not trump. 
III.  CONSEQUENCES OF PERPETUATING THE MYTH OF 
SELF-REGULATION   
This Article has already suggested that, despite the reality 
that law is a heavily regulated industry, commentators and 
courts cling to the view that the profession is self-regulated.111 
Of course, lawyers are heavily involved in all aspects of regula-
tion. It is natural that lawyers should contribute to the drafting 
of ethics rules because lawyers are the people most familiar 
with law practice. Lawyers also participate in litigation involv-
ing lawyers because someone must present and defend the cas-
es. Judges and high-ranking employees of administrative agen-
cies that regulate lawyers tend to be members of the bar 
because legal training qualifies them for those positions.  
The involvement of members of the profession in all as-
pects of the regulatory process thus, in a limited sense, diffe-
rentiates law from other regulated professions. Doctors, for in-
stance, may have a hand in peer review mechanisms and state 
certification boards but cannot control judicial or legislative 
oversight. The more powerful position of lawyers in regulation 
is inevitable because legislating and implementing legal rules 
are at their core legal functions; it is lawyers who are trained 
for these enterprises and have the requisite expertise. Although 
 
 110. In a forthcoming piece, John Leubsdorf notes:  
[M]ore and more regulators have sought to regulate the bar. If once 
the American Bar Association’s codes dominated the field, now courts 
have become increasingly unwilling to defer to them, and legislators 
and administrators have become increasingly unwilling to defer to ei-
ther bar associations or courts. We are witnessing the decline of the 
ideal of professional self-regulation at the same time that the ideal 
has been almost entirely demolished in England. 
John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Fall Apart, 56 BUFF. L. REV (forthcoming 2009) 
(manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1320302. 
 111. See supra notes 9–10. 
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society could include more lay participants in the lawyer regu-
latory process, regulators would find themselves at significant 
substantive and tactical disadvantages if they avoided all re-
liance on persons with legal training.112  
The presence of persons with legal training among the reg-
ulators, however, does not automatically mean that the regula-
tors tilt the law in lawyers’ favor.113 It simply means that the 
regulators have knowledge about what lawyers do. Some com-
mentators have questioned the good faith of the personnel who 
draft the professional codes,114 but the consensus is that law-
yer-regulators in other contexts—particularly judges and mod-
ern disciplinary prosecutors—implement their functions rela-
tively objectively.115 Bemoaning as “self-regulatory” any lawyer 
involvement in the enforcement of standards governing lawyers 
therefore seems both tautological and of little substantive im-
port. 
Moreover, use of the term “self-regulation” to refer both to 
the establishment of norms governing lawyers and lawyer-
judges’ control of disciplinary processes can cause confusion in 
thinking about lawyer regulation. Maintaining the presence of 
lawyers throughout the regulatory process is not what many 
commentators who support self-regulation have in mind when 
referring to the importance of self-regulation.116 Rather, they 
 
 112. Cf. Burnele V. Powell, Creating Space for Lawyers To Be Ethical: Driv-
ing Towards an Ethic of Transparency, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1108 (2006) 
(noting the “populist view” that lawyer regulation should be reorganized “to 
assure that any organized voice for lawyers be subordinated to regulators who 
are neither lawyers nor brought to the process by (or on behalf of ) lawyers”). 
 113. See Fox, supra note 16, at 1549 (“Lawyers only really self-regulate to 
the extent that state supreme courts and other members of the judiciary 
choose to delegate that authority to the profession.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Gillers, supra note 75, at 245, 255–56 (characterizing the 
Model Rules as self-serving); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A 
Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 710–12 
(1981) (describing particular code provisions as self-serving).  
 115. One notable exception among the commentators is Benjamin Barton. 
See Barton, supra note 24, at 454–55 (“[I]f there is a clear advantage or disad-
vantage to the legal profession in any given question of law, the cases are easy 
to predict: judges will choose the route (within the bounds of precedent and 
seemliness) that benefits the profession as a whole.”). Barton does not go so far 
as to impugn the judiciary’s good faith, but suggests that the tilt in favor of 
lawyers’ interests is objectively verifiable. See id. at 456–57, 503 (“It may be 
that while judges treat lawyers differently—and better—this treatment is jus-
tified.”).  
 116. Some commentators do equate self-regulation with the fact that the 
professional codes are enforced by judges who themselves are lawyers. See, 
e.g., Lee, supra note 17, at 73 (“[A]lthough the judiciary is a branch of govern-
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envision a situation in which lawyers unilaterally implement 
worthwhile rules117 and adhere to them voluntarily, so as to 
obviate the need for outside interference with legal practice.118 
Proponents also often imagine that lawyers will contribute to 
the self-regulating process by reporting violations of the profes-
sional standards to disciplinary authorities.119  
 
ment, it is a branch made up of lawyers.”); Rentz, supra note 23, at 307 (criti-
cizing the performance of disciplinary judges).  
 117. See David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: Who Will 
Write the Future Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers Representing Public 
Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 873, 906–07 (2003) (“[T]he legal profession 
is essentially a self-regulated profession . . . . [T]he rules governing the profes-
sional and ethical conduct of attorneys are primarily written, revised, and 
promulgated by members of the legal profession.”); Fischer, supra note 1, at 95 
(“[D]irect judicial regulation of the bar has been relaxed and distant. The judi-
ciary, while retaining nominal power, has largely delegated responsibility for 
professional control to the bar.”); Kevin E. Mohr, California’s Duty of Confi-
dentiality: Is It Time for a Life-Threatening Criminal Act Exception?, 39 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 307, 312 n.9 (2002) (“The legal profession is self-regulated, pri-
marily through the various codes of professional conduct the states have 
adopted during this century.”); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and 
Contemporary Law Firm Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931, 937–38 (2002) 
(“The ostensibly unique nature of legal services has been invoked for more 
than a century to justify self-regulation—the claim that the legal profession 
should have authority to determine for itself the nature of its ethical obliga-
tions.”); cf. Barton, supra note 17, at 1186–210 (arguing that bar code drafters 
largely control decisions of the state supreme courts deciding whether to adopt 
proposed codes); Macey, supra note 10, at 1081 (positing that “the practice of 
law is still self-regulated” and that “[c]ensure by a bar association [today] does 
not carry much of a social stigma when the bar itself is not viewed with re-
spect”).  
 118. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They 
Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 731, 733 (2002) (“This is one sense in which the 
legal profession is partly . . . self-regulating: Lawyers have a personal respon-
sibility to act in conformity with professional norms; . . . lawyers are presuma-
bly capable of figuring out what is expected of them, at least most of the 
time.”). 
William Gallagher characterizes the traditional argument in favor of self-
regulation as follows: 
[L]awyers, and other specialized professions, possess complex and 
esoteric knowledge and skills; therefore, they should be allowed to 
self-regulate because they alone have the specialized knowledge to 
understand the unique nature of their profession’s problems and 
hence, to apply effective cures. Outside interference in this process, 
commentators argue, would undermine the profession’s public orien-
tation and subject it to regulation that is harmful to both the profes-
sion and the public.  
Gallagher, supra note 35, at 489; see also Pearce, supra note 35, at 1359−60 
(discussing the relationship between self-regulation and professionalism that 
is marked by an absence of self-interest). 
 119. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 12 (“A lawyer should 
also aid in securing . . . observance [of the rules] by other lawyers.”); id. R. 8.3 
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The following pages discuss the consequences of relying on 
the idealized image of lawyers as self-monitoring and self-
policing. The persistence of this self-regulation paradigm has 
adverse effects on state supreme courts, trial courts supervising 
litigation, bar regulators, lawyers, and laypersons dealing with, 
or observing, the bar.  
A. CONSEQUENCES FOR STATE SUPREME COURTS 
State supreme courts are intimately involved in lawyer 
regulation in three ways. First, they are responsible for prom-
ulgating their jurisdictions’ codes of professional responsibility, 
a task they usually accomplish after reviewing and sometimes 
amending (or rejecting) proposals that come from local bar 
committees. Second, they oversee the disciplinary process by 
serving as courts of last resort after findings of discipline are 
made. Third, they preside as the ultimate courts of appeal over 
the development of substantive common law governing lawyers 
(e.g., malpractice law) and lower-court supervisory authority. 
In one respect, it is odd that the notion of lawyer self-
regulation persists when supreme courts, rather than the bar, 
actually promulgate the prevailing professional codes. The no-
tion survives, in part, because state supreme courts sometimes 
fail to take an active role in the code-development process. 
They may accept bar proposals unquestioningly and avoid se-
rious inquiry into the substance. When state supreme courts 
defer in this way, the best explanation is the concept of lawyer 
self-regulation; the justices retain a sense that constraining 
 
(implementing a limited reporting requirement); Arthur F. Greenbaum, The 
Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 261–62 (2003) (characterizing the lawyer reporting 
rule as “a rule at the heart of the bar’s claim to self-regulation”); Stanton Haz-
lett, Duty to Report Attorney Misconduct, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Oct. 2004, at 11, 12 
(“In Kansas the legal profession is self-regulated. As lawyers, we must ensure 
that self-regulation continues by reporting lawyer misconduct when we have 
knowledge of it.”); Carole R. Richelieu, Ethics & Issues, HAW. B.J., Dec. 2004, 
at 18, 18 (“Why do attorneys have a duty to ‘squeal?’ The simple answer is be-
cause the legal profession is self-regulating.”). Most observers, however, note 
that the reporting obligation has been honored mostly in the breach. See, e.g., 
Barnhizer, supra note 19, at 258 (“[L]awyers rarely report delinquent behavior 
. . . .”); Zacharias, supra note 92, at 999 (“While violations of these provisions 
are prosecuted occasionally, the reporting requirements typically are honored 
in the breach.”); Julie L. Hussey, Comment, Reporting Another Attorney for 
Violating the Rules of Professional Conduct: The Current Status of the Law in 
the States Which Have Adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 23 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 265, 266–67 (1999) (identifying only two cases in which attorneys 
were disciplined for violating reporting rules). 
 2009] MYTH OF SELF-REGULATION 1175 
 
lawyer behavior is a project for the bar and that the courts 
should get involved only, or mainly, when specific disputes in-
volving particular misconduct arise. 
Benjamin Barton120 and others121 have highlighted practic-
al reasons why, quite separate from judges’ identity as lawyers, 
state supreme courts might give in to the self-regulation para-
digm despite their clear authority and responsibility for setting 
the professional rules. Supreme court justices are not used to 
developing law in the abstract, preferring instead to respond to 
concrete cases.122 They do not have resources for conducting 
legislative-type hearings.123 And they do not like to issue pros-
pective or advisory decisions regarding the appropriateness or 
legality of conduct.124 
The consequences of abdication, however, are significant. 
Abdication allows the supreme courts, and their law-making 
authority, to be captured by the bar.125 The failure to delve 
deeply into reform proposals may enable the bar to incorporate 
self-serving provisions into the codes.126 For these reasons, I 
and others have encouraged state supreme courts to take their 
code-promulgation responsibility more seriously.127  
 
 120. Barton, supra note 17, at 1196. 
 121. See, e.g., Zacharias & Green, supra note 4 (discussing the functions 
and tendencies of state supreme courts when promulgating professional 
codes). 
 122. See Barton, supra note 17, at 1204 (“Courts are not natural legisla-
tors. It cuts against the grain of their institutional mission and self-image.”). 
 123. See id. at 1207 (“Given that judges are faced with a scarcity of re-
sources . . . something has to give. . . . [T]he abdication of their regulatory re-
sponsibilities is a convenient solution.” (footnote omitted)). 
 124. See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never 
Gets Any “Dear John” Letters: Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 
GEO. L.J. 473 passim (1998) (discussing the historical reluctance of courts to 
issue advisory opinions). 
 125. See Barton, supra note 17, at 1186 (arguing that state supreme courts 
have a propensity for being captured by the bar); cf. Lawrence W. Kessler, The 
Unchanging Face of Legal Malpractice: How the “Captured” Regulators of the 
Bar Protect Attorneys, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 457, 465–66 (2002) (arguing that all 
the legal regulators of lawyers have been captured). 
 126. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 26, at 320 (arguing that state su-
preme courts should avoid rubber-stamping permissive rules because they are 
particularly prone to being self-serving). 
 127. See id.; Fred C. Zacharias, Are Evidence-Related Ethics Provisions 
“Law?,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1334 (2007) (“The more state supreme 
courts actively participate in the formulation of the professional rules . . . the 
likelier it is that the discrepancies between ethics and evidence law . . . will 
disappear.”). 
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What is significant for purposes of this Article, however, is 
that the myth of lawyers as self-regulators has consequences 
for how state supreme courts act. Initially, thinking about pro-
fessional standards in terms of self-regulation may encourage 
the courts to avoid taking a strong position on the substance of 
the codes. Thereafter, it often prevents the courts from conduct-
ing fully independent review of bar committee findings. The no-
tion of self-regulation (in its most negative sense) thus becomes 
a self-fulfilling prophecy: lawyer-judges do not adequately exer-
cise their authority to constrain the bar’s excesses. 
Perhaps more disappointing, however, is that thinking in 
terms of self-regulation also prevents state supreme courts 
from exercising functions that are exclusively within their pur-
view. Standards in the professional codes often cover the same 
conduct as other legal standards governing lawyers, including 
civil law and judge-made supervisory decisions.128 Courts im-
plementing the latter standards sometimes look to the profes-
sional codes for guidance but also often treat the codes as irre-
levant, thus leading to inconsistent behavioral requirements for 
lawyers.129 Because the state supreme courts have the power to 
review lower courts’ decisions, they are in a unique position to 
harmonize the decisions with the professional codes or to ex-
plain when divergence from the codes is justified. 
In other words, state supreme courts have the wherewithal 
to reconcile the professional codes with substantive law and 
supervisory standards in two ways. First, when promulgating 
the codes, they can predict in forward-looking fashion the direc-
tion the substantive law (e.g., malpractice law) will take be-
cause it is they who will have the power to adjust the substan-
tive law. Supreme courts taking their code-promulgation role 
seriously therefore can adopt professional rules that take ac-
count of lawyers’ potential liability under the substantive law 
or judge-made supervisory requirements.130 Second, in review-
ing lower courts’ supervisory and substantive law decisions on 
appeal, supreme courts can, in backward-looking fashion, har-
monize those decisions with the professional codes’ standards; 
 
 128. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 4 (manuscript at 28–29); see also 
infra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing these forms of regulation). 
 129. See Zacharias, supra note 127, at 1334 (“[C]ourts sometimes reject the 
codes’ pronouncements on evidence law, sometimes defer to them (usually 
through adoption of parallel common law), and sometimes agree with them 
but do not treat them as legal gospel.”). 
 130. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 4 (manuscript at 65) (discussing 
state supreme courts’ “predictive function”). 
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they can make clear when and why lower courts are justified in 
departing from the codes’ standards governing lawyer beha-
vior.131 To the extent that supreme courts continue to rely on 
the notion of self-regulation to avoid active development of the 
overall law governing lawyers, their misguided notion contri-
butes to inconsistencies in the law and creates a regime in 
which lawyers often have difficulty accurately assessing their 
own responsibilities. 
B. CONSEQUENCES FOR LOWER, SUPERVISORY COURTS 
The converse also is true. Because lower courts persist in 
perceiving the professional codes as a form of bar self-
regulation, the courts often do not attach sufficient significance 
to the codes as governing law. Lower court judges rarely would 
disobey a recent supreme court opinion setting forth a legal 
doctrine. Yet, in issuing supervisory rulings and presiding over 
cases involving civil or criminal law regulating lawyers, the tri-
al bench routinely treats the adoption of the professional code 
as less relevant, or less binding, than other supreme court legal 
decisions.132  
In treating the professional codes as, at most, a weak form 
of law, the lower courts assume that the codes deserve minimal 
respect. That assumption must stem from one of three beliefs: 
(1) that the governing supreme court in fact has not established 
the law inherent in the adopted professional code, deferring in-
stead to bar self-regulation; (2) that the supreme court’s own 
sense of the code as an aspect of self-regulation renders the 
code less valuable or authoritative; or (3) that the code is full 
law, but that the supreme court does not intend it to apply out-
side the disciplinary context. 
These three possible beliefs all have the same impact. They 
discourage lower courts from making a serious effort to deter-
mine how supervisory regimes, substantive law, and discipli-
nary standards interrelate and should be reconciled. This, in 
turn, produces inconsistent decision making among judges who 
have varying levels of respect for professional self-regulation, 
ultimately leading to inconsistent standards for lawyer beha-
vior. Lawyers are left unable to rely on the professional codes 
 
 131. See id. (discussing state supreme courts’ coordinating function). 
 132. See id. (manuscript at 82–83) (describing lower courts’ reactions to 
professional standards). 
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as guidance for their behavior because even compliant behavior 
may leave them subject to civil liability or judicial sanction.133 
In substance, a lower court’s belief that the code is not in-
tended as controlling law, even in situations in which its terms 
seem to apply, justifies the court in downplaying the normative 
force of the rules. Particularly where the professional rules del-
egate matters to lawyer discretion, the court may assume that 
the bar’s “self-regulating” code drafters have accorded discre-
tion either for self-serving reasons or because the drafters could 
not achieve consensus regarding the merits.134 In fact, grants of 
discretion may be based on legitimate substantive reasons, in-
cluding lawyers’ superior expertise in making particular deci-
sions or the reality that flexibility is needed in order to address 
fact-sensitive issues that are likely to arise.135  
Consider, for example, a permissive exception to attorney-
client confidentiality that allows disclosure to prevent harm to 
third parties. A trial judge crafting parallel attorney-client pri-
vilege law might take the normative suggestions of the confi-
dentiality exception into account, but only if the judge perceives 
that the confidentiality exception reflects the supreme court’s 
view of the appropriate balance between attorney-client secrecy 
and courts’ need to obtain relevant evidence. In contrast, if the 
judge perceives the confidentiality rule to be merely the bar’s 
self-regulation—readily accepted by the state supreme court 
without serious consideration—he is more likely to treat the 
permissive exception as an effort by the bar to insulate lawyers 
from sanction when they fail to disclose what they should.136 
The belief of some lower courts that supreme court over-
sight is a form of self-regulation, right or wrong, therefore in-
terferes with a reasoned assessment of how the continuing 
work of regulating lawyers should be distributed. Trial judges 
 
 133. See, e.g., Green v. Nevers, 111 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 1997) (stat-
ing that an attorney’s agreed-upon fees are subject to judicial reduction even if 
the fees are not “so ‘clearly excessive’ as to justify a finding of breach of ethical 
rules” governing the reasonableness of fees (quoting McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. 
Maynard, 758 F.2d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 1985))). 
 134. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 26, at 312−14 (noting that permis-
sive rules have greater risk of being self-serving). 
 135. See id. at 298−312 (discussing potentially legitimate interests under-
lying permissive rules).  
 136. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiali-
ty, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 72−74 (1999) (discussing similar justifications that 
underlie attorney-client privilege law and attorney-client confidentiality rules 
but noting the courts’ hesitation to harmonize the doctrines because of a sense 
that they reflect distinct visions of what is appropriate). 
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who do not trust supreme court professional regulation (or as-
sume that the governing supreme court does not intend the 
code to be treated as full law) will not defer to the supreme 
court’s standards even when, in fact, they represent the su-
preme court’s considered opinion.137 Nor will the lower courts 
attempt to harmonize their regulatory decisions with the codes 
and disciplinary law. 
C. CONSEQUENCES FOR BAR CODE-DRAFTERS 
From the bar’s perspective, the notion of self-regulation 
stems from the perception that, because lawyers are most fa-
miliar with legal practice, lawyers themselves can best under-
stand the demands upon them and are therefore best qualified 
to write the rules governing their conduct. Many commentators 
suggest that the bar, through the codes, attempts to press its 
separate vision of law and the role of lawyers—one that often is 
at odds with the vision of the courts and the state.138 Some-
times the inconsistent professional rules are designed to en-
courage changes in external law,139 sometimes they are meant 
simply to operate in an independent sphere (i.e., professional 
discipline),140 and sometimes they reflect pronouncements of 
defiance by the bar.141 
To the extent that the commentators are correct in their 
assessment of the purposes of the code,142 there are a variety of 
costs associated with professional rule making that challenges 
external law. First, it undermines the function of providing 
 
 137. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 4 (manuscript at 58). 
 138. For a comprehensive discussion of this view, see Susan P. Koniak, The 
Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1391 (1992). 
 139. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 83, at 274−78 (discussing the codes’ 
function of influencing judicial standards); cf. Green & Zacharias, supra note 
26, at 308 (discussing the codes’ function of filling in “gaps in the law”). 
 140. Thus, for example, professional rules governing attorney-client confi-
dentiality can coexist with judicial evidentiary law governing attorney-client 
privilege because the two concepts operate in different spheres—general secre-
cy versus secrecy in litigation. See Zacharias, supra note 136, at 73–74 (dis-
cussing the context and development of the secrecy principles governing attor-
neys). Nevertheless, the two concepts place very different emphases on the 
relative importance of maintaining confidentiality in the attorney-client rela-
tionship and the corresponding importance of obtaining evidence that will aid 
the truth-seeking process. See id. 
 141. See Koniak, supra note 138, at 1401 (describing competition between 
the bar and the state in their views of the law).  
 142. But see Zacharias & Green, supra note 38, at 57−60 (offering an alter-
native to the view that the codes are continually at odds with external law be-
cause of the bar’s independent substantive vision). 
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lawyers with guidance about how they should act; if the codes 
encourage conduct inconsistent with the letter or spirit of judi-
cially enforced rules, lawyers follow the codes at their peril. 
Second, rule making that challenges external law undermines 
faith in the legitimacy of the rules.143 Third, it makes the rules 
less important because it effectively confines their applicability 
to the narrow areas in which the codes alone govern. 
Because of the process through which the model codes are 
adopted, it is difficult to generalize about, or prove the actual 
intentions of, the drafters. Although new rules typically are 
proposed by a committee, ultimately the whole body of ABA 
delegates vote on the proposals, and thus many different ap-
proaches inevitably are at play. It is likely, however, that at 
least some portion of the approving body typically thinks of the 
codes as reflecting the bar’s special insights and hopes to press, 
or seek implementation of, the bar’s separate, superior exper-
tise.144 
A significant consequence of this approach to self-
regulation is that it perpetuates the view that external regula-
tion is an evil to be prevented or minimized. The persistence of 
this mindset is evident in the Preamble to the Model Rules.145 
Rather than attempting to mesh the professional rules and ex-
ternal law or attempting to build upon external law, the code 
drafters remain willing to adopt rules inconsistent with exter-
nal law, which lawyers then attempt to use as a defense, im-
munity, or for other personal benefit. 
One example was the ABA’s fairly recent promulgation of 
rules designed to prevent prosecutors from subpoenaing attor-
neys to the grand jury.146 The ABA opposed attorney subpoenas 
on the basis that they are inconsistent with the bar’s broad 
conception of attorney-client confidentiality and the importance 
of maintaining attorney-client relationships;147 the subpoe-
 
 143. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 26, at 315−18 (suggesting that ex-
ternal lawmakers’ responses to the professional rules reasonably depend on 
their view of the purposes of the rules). 
 144. See, e.g., Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The 
Conceptual Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1110−12 (2006) (describing efforts by the ABA to “side-
track” threatened federal regulation under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 145. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 146. See generally Stern & Hoffman, supra note 102, at 1789–95, 1820–24 
(describing the ABA rule and the surrounding controversy). 
 147. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal 
Prosecutors: The Controversies over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 
U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 364−67 (1992) (discussing the history of Model Rule 
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naing of a defense attorney to testify against his client can chill 
the client’s trust in his attorney.148 The reality, however, is that 
under common substantive law definitions of attorney-client 
privilege, prosecutors often are perfectly justified in subpoe-
naing attorneys, because information provided by clients for 
the purpose of obtaining assistance in criminal activity is legal-
ly unprivileged.149 By pressing its vision in the subpoena rules 
rather than accepting privilege law as a given, the ABA for-
feited the opportunity to promulgate different regulations or 
legislative initiatives that might have accommodated the legi-
timate rights of defendants.150 In the end, the bar’s actual pro-
posals were doomed to failure because they were inconsistent 
with external law and courts were unwilling to enforce them.151 
This example suggests that viewing professional regulation 
as self- rather than co-regulation encourages the bar to act too 
independently in its rule making. An explicit effort to mesh the 
codes and external law would guide lawyers better, make the 
codes more acceptable to external authorities, and harmonize 
the law. More importantly, it would help the bar assess the 
rules and their potential effect more realistically. 
Addressing the rules as co-regulation would also enhance 
the efficiency of the codes. One recurring issue is whether and 
when maintaining ethics provisions make sense in the absence 
of active disciplinary enforcement.152 If the underlying sub-
stance of a particular unenforced rule is enforced through pa-
 
3.8(f )); Koniak, supra note 138, at 1398−401 (discussing the bar’s justifications 
for proposing Model Rule 3.8(f )).  
 148. See, e.g., Genego, supra note 99, at 874−75 (cataloguing adverse ef-
fects of attorney subpoenas). 
 149. Zacharias, supra note 102, at 930 (“[T]he mere existence of ideals and 
standards of conduct in the codes is not a basis for refusing disclosure of in-
formation in court.”). 
 150. See id. at 944−54 (identifying a change to grand jury secrecy rules 
that would have accommodated both the bar’s and prosecutors’ concerns). 
 151. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF ’L RESPONSI-
BILITY, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 7 
(1995), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF 
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 249−50 (1996) (successfully proposing 
deletion of the judicial supervision requirement in Model Rule 3.8(f ) and not-
ing that numerous states’ bars and courts rejected the requirement). The ABA 
report proposing deletion noted that the record on Model Rule 3.8(f ) “reflects a 
fundamental and widespread doubt about the suitability of Rule 3.8(f ) in its 
current form as a rule of ethics, a doubt that the Standing Committee has 
come to share.” Id. at 250. 
 152. For a full discussion of this issue, see Zacharias, supra note 92, at 
1005–12. 
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rallel external law, that might speak to elimination of the rule 
absent an independent reason to keep it;153 ordinarily, perpe-
tuating unenforced provisions undermines their force and law-
yers’ respect for the codes.154 Conversely, identifying the guid-
ance provided by external law would inform the bar about 
when professional regulation is necessary to fill gaps. 
Perhaps more importantly, the misguided perception that 
external regulation should be fended off through the promulga-
tion of self-regulatory codes misleads the bar into focusing its 
resources inefficiently. There are some aspects of regulation 
that bar organizations understand best and do well, others that 
the bar might better leave to other institutions. For example, 
ethics codes and professional disciplinary processes probably 
are not particularly effective mechanisms for regulating illegal 
conduct by lawyers; code provisions governing illegality tend to 
be unspecific and disciplinary officials typically do not have the 
resources required for criminal investigations.155 There is no 
legitimate theoretical reason for the bar to discourage or at-
tempt to forestall criminal prosecutions156 because unlawful 
conduct is prohibited under the codes as well.  
In contrast, the bar is in a relatively good position to estab-
lish programs providing assistance for lawyers who engage in 
substance abuse. The bar can understand the pressures of a le-
gal career and make itself aware of the extent of the substance 
abuse problem in the particular jurisdiction. It can also offer 
peer support. Nevertheless, difficulties arise when the bar si-
multaneously takes upon itself the project of “self-regulating” 
the adverse consequences of the behavior of addicted lawyers in 
order to fend off outside regulation; regulating those conse-
 
 153. See Macey, supra note 10, at 1082 (“[T]he legal profession and clients 
would benefit from abandoning [self-regulation] for a private contracting mod-
el that treats clients as investors to whom lawyers owe standard fiduciary du-
ties of care, loyalty, good faith, and disclosure.”). 
 154. See Zacharias, supra note 92, at 1016. But see Fred C. Zacharias, Inte-
grity Ethics (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7, 23, 44–47, on file with au-
thor) (discussing situations in which unenforced rules may play a meaningful 
role).  
 155. For example, disciplinary prosecutors may not have access to investi-
gators, grand jury mechanisms, or even subpoena power. See Stern & Hoff-
man, supra note 102, at 1820–22. 
 156. Cf. Macey, supra note 10, at 1085 (“[L]awyers benefit from self-
governance, and thus are loathe to take actions that would make the existence 
of unprofessional conduct salient to any administrative authority, as focusing 
on incivility could lead to criticism of the very status quo regulatory structure 
from which lawyers benefit.”). 
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quences for the benefit of clients can be inconsistent with pro-
viding assistance to the regulated lawyers. It might be prefera-
ble for the bar to accept external regulation—even, for example, 
to the extent of encouraging criminal prosecutors to prosecute 
addicted lawyers who abuse their clients’ trust accounts—and 
to itself focus on serving the assistance, rather than the regula-
tory, function.157 
Recognizing the interrelationship between professional 
codes and external law can also lead the bar to engage in coop-
erative endeavors that will help lawyers comply with external 
law in a way disciplinary codes cannot. For example, analyzing 
the S&L scandals of the 1980s, Ted Schneyer finds that the un-
specific nature of many ethics provisions applicable to banking 
lawyers, while justifiable as encouraging lawyer introspection, 
provided neither a basis for discipline nor adequate guidance 
concerning how to act.158 At the same time, their ambiguity 
opened the door to aggressive agency regulation of lawyers.159 
Schneyer suggests that a realistic assessment of the interrela-
tionship between the codes and external law should prompt the 
bar to participate in developing protocols independent of the 
codes in order to guide future banking lawyers’ behavior; this 
would best enable banking lawyers to comport with the obliga-
tions of external regulation while acting in a professional man-
ner.160 Such an approach is only possible, however, if the bar 
recognizes the limitations of the ethics codes, the functions al-
ternative to code-drafting that the bar can serve, and the value 
of acting cooperatively as a co-regulator with courts, agencies, 
and legislatures. 
In short, perceiving the role of the professional codes un-
realistically as a regulatory regime that should operate in the 
place of external regulation can cause the bar to err in the rules 
it includes, the way it writes its rules, and the focus of its oper-
ations. Conversely, recognizing the professional codes as co-
 
 157. See Zacharias, supra note 26, at 28 (“[T]he bar may need to withdraw 
somewhat from regulating and disciplining lawyers with respect to human 
vices, concentrate on education and treatment efforts, and emphasize nonpro-
fessional remedies for clients who are injured by the behavior of affected law-
yers.”). 
 158. See Schneyer, supra note 16, at 650–51, 666−68. 
 159. See id. at 666 (“[T]he bar’s vague ethics rules have proven to have 
huge and unexpected in terrorem effects.”). 
 160. See id. at 672−73; cf. Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, 
Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 33 (2002) (urging the bar to re-
gulate “cooperatively”).  
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regulation would help the bar tailor its regulatory endeavors to 
gaps in the law and to forms of behavior that the bar, and the 
professional disciplinary process, is particularly well-suited to 
regulating. Overall, meshing the codes with external law can 
lead to a clearer regulatory regime and better guidance for law-
yers. It also would maximize the bar’s resources by avoiding 
duplicative regulation. 
D. CONSEQUENCES FOR LAWYERS 
This Article has already noted the main consequence of the 
persistent image of self-regulation for lawyers themselves.161 
Self-regulation creates questions about the nature of the pro-
fessional codes as binding law, thereby undermining the value 
of the codes in providing guidance.162 At one level, if lawyers 
conceptualize the codes as self-regulation, they may feel freer to 
disagree or disobey the codes, particularly when the drafters 
have expressed their vision of appropriate conduct through hor-
tatory or discretionary rules.163 After all, the drafters of the 
self-regulatory provisions are simply lawyers whose opinion re-
garding appropriate conduct seems to have no more validity 
than the individual lawyers’ own.164 
More significantly, to the extent that conceptualizing the 
codes as self-regulation encourages supervisory courts to depart 
from the standards in the codes,165 lawyers are left in the dark 
concerning how they may behave.166 Sometimes the judicial de-
partures simply reflect a refusal to enforce the codes, but leave 
the behavioral mandates in the code intact.167 On other occa-
 
 161. See, e.g., supra note 133 and accompanying text.  
 162. See supra text accompanying note 132. 
 163. A grant of discretion in the professional code can, of course, mean 
many things ranging from a suggestion that equally legitimate options exist to 
a requirement that lawyers act in accordance with the spirit of the rule. See 
Green & Zacharias, supra note 26, at 276−87 (discussing competing interpre-
tations of permissive rules). 
 164. As discussed in Zacharias, supra note 92, at 1005–06, lawyers seem 
willing to depart from the mandates of professional rules that they do not be-
lieve will be enforced against them. The willingness to depart suggests that 
lawyers have a latent readiness to substitute their own calculus for that of the 
rule makers. 
 165. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 4 (manuscript at 80–84) (discuss-
ing supervisory courts’ willingness to depart from the code standards). 
 166. See Leubsdorf, supra note 110 (manuscript at 3) (“The fragmentation 
of the law of the legal profession . . . complicates the lives of lawyers.”).  
 167. See, e.g., Sealed Party v. Sealed Party, No. H-04-2229, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28392, at *68 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2006) (rejecting a breach of fiduciary 
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sions, however, the judicial mandates may be stricter—as, for 
example, when a court disqualifies a lawyer with a conflict of 
interest despite the fact that the lawyer obtained consent that, 
under the prevailing code, seems to authorize the representa-
tion.168 The lawyer is left unable to know when he can rely on 
the code’s provisions and when he cannot. 
This is not to gainsay the salutary effects that the notion of 
self-regulation can have. To this point, this Article has alluded 
mainly to the potential function of self-regulation in fending off 
external oversight of the profession. Self-regulation can, how-
ever, be beneficial over a range of practice situations by en-
couraging lawyers to think about what constitutes appropriate 
behavior and to rein in their worst inclinations. Unfortunately, 
not all lawyers—some would argue few lawyers—are capable of 
such self-control in the face of economic incentives to act for 
personal benefit.169 Emphasizing the self-regulatory nature of 
professional mandates frees lawyers who disavow introspection 
and restraint to read the codes narrowly and to seek loopholes 
that authorize self-interested behavior.170 
E. CONSEQUENCES FOR LAYPERSONS 
For laypersons, the primary consequence of the myth that 
lawyers control their own regulation is one of perception. Lay-
persons assume that the bar self-regulates in a self-serving 
way.171 Likewise, they assume that rules which produce super-
 
claim arising from a lawyer’s disclosure of client confidences because the client 
was not damaged by the disclosure).  
 168. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731, 755 (Utah 2003) (noting 
criminal court judges’ authority to reject clients’ waivers of conflicts of interest 
and to disqualify clients’ choice of counsel). 
 169. Jonathan Macey argues that with the decline of the bar’s monopoly 
power, self-regulation by the bar has become “an idea whose time has gone.” 
Macey, supra note 10, at 1094, 1096. Macey suggests that, because sanctions 
are ineffective, lawyers no longer fear enforcement of the bar’s standards, and 
that acting in self-interested and unprofessional ways therefore has become an 
efficient approach. See id. at 1094–96.  
 170. Cf. David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal to 
Grant Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1825 n.1 (2004) (suggesting that lawyers will universally 
apply discretionary confidentiality exceptions in the way that maximizes their 
self-interest). 
 171. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 675, 715 (2003) (“Excusing rule violations, even well-intended 
rule violations, . . . risks sending the public a message that the professional 
standards will not be enforced when an accused lawyer offers an arguable 
excuse for a violation.” (footnote omitted)). 
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ficially unpleasant results for society—including rules requir-
ing zealous representation of guilty defendants and the main-
tenance of unpleasant confidences—do so because lawyers de-
rive a benefit therefrom, rather than because the rules serve 
important systemic functions.172 
Equally important, the perception that the profession is 
self-regulated through bar associations, rather than co-
regulated, causes laypersons to ascribe either too much or the 
wrong significance to the disciplinary process. Professional dis-
cipline serves many functions, of which punishment of the law-
yer may be the least important.173 Particularly when a lawyer 
is punished for bad conduct through alternative means—for ex-
ample criminal or civil liability—disciplinary authorities may 
focus on the licensing function: determining whether the law-
yer is able to represent future clients well.174 Laypersons who 
perceive discipline as the sum total of lawyer regulation become 
discouraged when conduct that may be inappropriate in one 
sense does not lead to professional sanctions.175 This in turn 
can produce distrust in the legal system and in the integrity of 
the bar as a whole.176 
Perhaps the best example of the dilemma for disciplinary 
regulators is, again, the issue of substance abuse by attorneys. 
Consider an attorney who, because of an addiction, has served 
past clients poorly. But assume further that the lawyer has un-
dergone treatment, is fully rehabilitated, and poses no further 
threat of inadequate representation. A disciplinary board judg-
ing whether this lawyer is fit to practice law in the future 
might well decide that he is. Lay observers, however, would 
perceive this decision as reflecting lawyers protecting their 
own. Only if the disciplinary authorities can plausibly point to 
other forms of regulation that punish or remedy the lawyer’s 
past misconduct—including malpractice, breach of fiduciary 
 
 172. See id. at 725–26, 726 n.186. 
 173. See Marks & Cathcart, supra note 22, at 232 (“What is needed is to 
remove the fault notion from the process of professional self-regulation.”); Za-
charias, supra note 171, 680, 680–82 (discussing the various goals of profes-
sional discipline, including punishment). 
 174. See Zacharias, supra note 171, at 684.  
 175. See Marks & Cathcart, supra note 22, at 234−35 (“The present discip-
linary approach fosters a belief on the part of the public that incompetent law-
yers are weeded out and that lawyers who remain certified are competent. . . . 
[T]he implication of self-regulation without the reality of self-regulation has 
unfortunate consequences.”). 
 176. See id. 
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duty, or criminal177 law—can the authorities hope to persuade 
lay observers of the integrity of the disciplinary system. The 
regulators must be able to make clear that the lawyer regulato-
ry regime is one of co- rather than self-regulation. 
IV.  A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE MODEL RULES   
The upshot of this Article’s analysis is that all parts of the 
American legal profession should embrace the notion that pro-
fessional standards of behavior are only one aspect of a multi-
pronged scheme of lawyer regulation. A prudent first step to-
wards acknowledging this reality would be an amendment to 
the portion of the Preamble to the ABA’s Model Rules that 
equates the codes to self-regulation. The amendment should 
exorcize all reference to self-regulation and, in place of that no-
tion, should emphasize the role of the professional code in the 
broader regulatory regime. 
Paragraphs ten, eleven, and the first half of twelve of the 
Preamble therefore might be replaced with the following 
statement:  
  The legal profession is heavily regulated. It is regulated simulta-
neously by state supreme courts promulgating and administering dis-
ciplinary rules, courts supervising lawyers in individual cases, admin-
istrative agencies setting standards for lawyers appearing before 
them, and civil and criminal law. Law sometimes is referred to as a 
self-regulating profession, but that is primarily because lawyers par-
ticipate in the process of setting the governing standards through 
their involvement in professional committees and as litigating attor-
neys who raise ethical issues about their adversaries. 
  The fact that the regulation of lawyers is shared among several 
regulators has consequences. In their practices, lawyers should not 
assume that one form of regulation is exclusive. Lawyers should act 
with respect for their roles as advocates for clients and as participants 
in the legal system, but should also be prepared to follow universal 
principals of law and morality when the special requirements of their 
roles do not mandate different conduct. The mandates of the profes-
sional code often are also interrelated with the mandates of external 
law; lawyers, code drafters, courts, and other regulators should at-
tempt to reconcile those mandates where possible. To the extent that 
lawyers simultaneously meet the obligations of their profession as de-
fined in the disciplinary rules, other legal requirements, and moral 
imperatives, the occasion for increased regulation will be obviated. 
These paragraphs, for the first time in the professional 
codes, would highlight the existence of external law regulating 
 
 177. In the substance abuse context, for example, criminal law might apply 
if the lawyer misappropriated client funds to pay for his addiction. See Zacha-
rias, supra note 171, at 678, 680–81.  
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lawyers and acknowledge the interrelationship between the 
various forms of regulation. They are designed to guide lawyers 
by dispelling the misperception that obedience to the code im-
munizes behavior from sanction and by encouraging lawyers to 
look to universal principles of morality and external law. 
The Model Rules are directed primarily at attorneys. The 
proposed amendment to the Preamble is designed to make clear 
to the bar the importance of understanding external regulation. 
One sentence of the proposal, however, is directed at the regu-
lators, urging them to confront the interrelationship of external 
law and the codes and to attempt to harmonize them when 
possible. As discussed above, many of the adverse consequences 
arising from the myth of self-regulation result from the failure 
of the regulators to acknowledge the fact that the codes, when 
adopted, become law. The proposal encourages a change in this 
practice. 
The proposal does not attempt to identify the precise func-
tions bar regulators should serve, or subjects they should avoid 
addressing, when promulgating professional rules. Previously, 
this Article concluded that the drafters might fruitfully elimi-
nate professional mandates in at least some situations in which 
external regulation exists or represents a superior approach to 
the targeted conduct.178 Simultaneously, the Article suggested 
that the bar should focus its resources on projects for which it 
is well suited and should encourage external regulators to act 
in those areas which fit their expertise.179 These approaches 
should develop by themselves as soon as the bar and external 
regulators come to grips with the interrelationship of the codes 
and external law. The above proposal therefore confines itself 
to a limited change that will help bring this recognition about. 
  CONCLUSION   
Whatever its actual meaning, the term “self-regulation” 
produces an image of lawyers unilaterally controlling the beha-
vior of their peers. That image is patently false. At best, the bar 
sets standards for its members that sometimes are followed 
and sometimes are enforced. At worst, the standards fail to ad-
dress key issues and are honored in the breach. In reality, con-
sumers of legal services who are injured, or potentially injured, 
by lawyer misconduct have recourse to civil remedies, statutory 
 
 178. See supra text accompanying note 153. 
 179. See supra notes 155−57 and accompanying text. 
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protections, and judicial regulation of lawyers that may mesh 
with, but often set standards that go well beyond, the mandates 
of professional codes.  
As this Article has discussed, however, the persistence of 
the image of self-regulation and the continued use of the term 
has consequences for the way lawyers, external regulators, and 
consumers perceive the bar and implement alternative regula-
tion. The ABA’s purported goals of self-regulation—fostering a 
complete regime of appropriate lawyer behavior and forestal-
ling external regulation—have proven unrealistic. Pursuing 
these goals arguably has undermined the effectiveness of the 
ABA’s and state bar organizations’ code-drafting projects and 
the readiness of bar organizations to welcome external regula-
tion in a way that would allow them to attend to other func-
tions that only they can accomplish. 
To some extent, the problems this Article has addressed 
are prompted by the semantic issue of how code-drafting efforts 
of the bar and disciplinary processes should be characterized, 
or thought about.180 No one would suggest that efforts by the 
bar to adopt standards of conduct or to encourage moral intros-
pection on the part of lawyers are a bad thing. Nor would even 
the most critical observers be inclined to eliminate professional 
discipline as a possible consequence for misbehaving lawyers; 
the potential for sanctions, including suspension or disbarment, 
needs to be inherent in any state-sanctioned regime that li-
censes professionals and thereby creates barriers to entry into 
the profession. And, to the extent that the bar, state supreme 
courts, or lawyer-judges implement standards that tilt unfairly 
in the direction of lawyer self-interest, criticism of their regula-
tion is justified. 
Continued use of the misleading term “self-regulation,” 
however, muddies the conceptual dividing line between lawyer 
self-restraint, professional codes that guide and monitor law-
yers, and judicially controlled discipline of the bar. It may well 
be, as some have suggested, that existing disciplinary processes 
are ineffective, misguided, or inadequately staffed and sup-
ported.181 If so, that should prompt direct inquiry into those is-
 
 180. The semantic issue is discussed in Fred C. Zacharias, The “Self-
Regulation” Misnomer, in REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS: TAKING STOCK AND 
NEW IDEAS (Reid Mortensen et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2009) (on file with au-
thor). 
 181. See generally CLARK REPORT, supra note 64, at 19, 24, 67, 97 (discuss-
ing the problems in disciplinary agencies); RHODE, supra note 88, at 158–61 
(describing disciplinary enforcement problems including inefficiencies, secre-
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sues, together with consideration of whether judicial control of 
the disciplinary process should be replaced with alternative 
mechanisms of lawyer regulation. Those issues become second-
ary when conceived as aspects of lawyer self-regulation, be-
cause lawyers as a group neither control the process nor are the 
cause of the failings that may be present. 
This Article therefore has proposed an appropriate seman-
tic solution. It encourages all participants in the lawyer-
regulatory process to abandon the misnomer “self-regulation,” 
and to replace the term with honest substitutes, such as “co-
regulation.” The proposed amendment to the Model Rules 
would be a first, symbolic change in this direction. The hard 
work that must follow—eliminating misguided or inherently 
self-serving regulation where it exists, distributing the work of 
regulating lawyers, and harmonizing and fleshing out the vari-
ous forms of co-regulation to produce an effective regulatory re-
gime—are projects for another day.  
 
tiveness, and inadequate punishment); Marks & Cathcart, supra note 22, at 
193–96, 206–21 (discussing the existing disciplinary problems with self-
regulation). 
